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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
,- The current project is part of a larger fault management research program
funded by NASA-Langley. The focus of this project is on alerting pilots to
impending events in such a way as to provide the additional time required for
the crew to make critical decisions concerning non-normal operations. The
project addresses pilots' need for support in diagnosis and trend monitoring of
faults as they affect decisions that must be made within the context of the
current flight.
Monitoring and diagnostic modules developed under the NASA Faultfinder
program were restructured and enhanced using as inputs data from an
engine model and real engine fault data. The model and data represent a
current high by-pass turbofan engine. A total of eight (8) fault scenarios were
prepared to support knowledge base development activities on the MONITAUR
and DRAPhyS modules of Faultfinder. An analysis of the information
requirements for fault management was included in each scenario. A
conceptual framework was developed for systematic evaluation of the impact of
context variables on pilot action alternatives as a function of event/fault
combinations. A major effort on the project involved an attempt to reduce
spurious symptoms in the output of the monitoring module. These spurious
symptoms have been greatly reduced but not eliminated. The rule base in
STAGE1 of DRAPhyS has been substantially enhanced based on fault data.
STAGE2 of DRAPhyS has been modified to accept inputs directly from
MONITAUR and suggestions for further enhancements to STAGE2 have been
prepared.
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Lesson learned include:
1. Solution of the spurious symptom problem with MONITAUR is
imperative before proceeding much further with enhancement of
diagnostic capability.
2. An adequate fault data base must be identified and accessed in order to
support further feasibility testing of the Flight Deck Engine Advisor
system.
3. The impact of context variables on the appropriateness of crew action
alternatives in the face of event/fault combinations needs to be
systematically evaluated.
4. The impact of current and anticipated levels of automation on fault
management in general and on context/crew action relationships in
particular should be determined.
A proposal submitted for follow-on activities in developing a Flight Deck
Engine Advisor system addresses the above recommendations.
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FINAL REPORT
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In today's commercial airliner flight decks, a non-normal event must have
occurred or a parameter threshold exceeded before an alert is evoked. This
leaves the crew with little or no advanced warning when response decisions
have to be made to events such as flame outs, thrust shortfall, or engine
overspeed. The degree of automation now present in the subsystem interface
on modern commercial airplanes can lead to situations where pilots are out of
the loop until their intervention is required. This in turn can lead to a
degradation in systems situational awareness and make the decision process
more difficult with a higher probability of error.
Automated monitoring and integration/fusion of engine data and airplane
information, for the purpose of diagnosing subtle faults or anticipating engine
abnormalities, could provide the additional time required for the crew to make
critical decisions concerning non-normal operations' This is especially
applicable during periods of high workload or during situations where
vigilance is reduced (e.g., long haul flights).
Single events (e.g., flame outs, etc) can be the result of many different faults.
However, the action required by flight crews to maintain or guard against
degradations in flight safety can vary as a function of both the fault and the
context in which it occurs. This program addresses pilots' need for support in
diagnosis or trend monitoring on faults as _ .affect decisions that must be
made within the context of the current _. Thus, aiding in diagnosis or
trend analysis need only be taken to the level at which crew actions and/or
decisions are affected.
1.1 Approach
The Engine Advisor development effort addresses issues from a pilot's
perspective (as opposed to that of a maintenance technician). The focus is on
the integration and correlatign of flight deck information within the
framework and foundation of the NASA Faultfinder Program (Refs. 1,2,3,4)
and is guided by the constructs of crew.centered automation(Ref. 5). This
effort builds upon the monitoring and diagnostic aspects of the Faultfinder
program, augmenting and rest'ructuring where necessary to accommodate
new technologies, and adapting the Faultfinder modules to be consistent with
current Boeing flight deck systems, operational requirements, and overall
flight deck philosophy.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between relevant components of the
Faultfinder concept and the contributions of Boeing and NASA-Langley on this
project. The specific objectives which generate the inputs needed for this
system are described in the following section.
The overall goal of the program is to provide air crews with information which
will support timely and accurate response decisions on extant or developing
engine faults.
This information will be generated by monitoring and diagnosis, correlated
with the phase of flight, operational constraints, airplane state, and the pilot's
overall flight objectives. Pilot expertise, flight operations manuals, flight deck
engineers and propulsion experts are being used to address a range of
situations and identify the information requirements.
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1.2 Objectives
The multi-year goal of the program is to develop an expert system advisor
which:
- assists the crew in system diagnosis (if appropriate) and recommends
applicable procedures in response to the situation;
- advises the crew of inconsistencies, adverse performance trends, or non-
normal situations before the condition becomes critical;
- monitors engine performance and displays critical information to the crew.
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Figure 1. Flight Deck Engine Advisor Modules
3Objectives for the first year effort include:
Select a candidate engine with readily available, stand alone engine model
and substantial real engine data;
Select and employ hardware/sol, ware tool combination(s) with maximum
utility and transportability;
Develop a set of fault scenarios for use in knowledge base
augmentation/restructuring and future testing;
Develop a data base of pilot information requirements to accompany fault
scenarios;
Restructure and augment STAGE1 & STAGE2, respectively, of DRAPhyS
portion of Faultfinder.
2.0 FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR PROGRAM PROGRESS
2.1 TASK 1 - Program Plan Development
A Detailed Program Plan was developed and delivered as Boeing Document
D6-55677 on May 3, 1990. A revised version was approved by June 1, 1990 and
work began on implementing the plan to achieve first year objectives.
2.2 TASK 2 - Definition and Scope of Effort
The definition and scope of the current effort insofar as fault coverage is
concerned involved four activities. These were:
- Define a sample of faults which would represent total possible faults;
- Determine sources and availability of fault propagation data;
- Determine approach and format for fault data representation;
- Conduct preliminary screening of candidate faults.
The first step in assembling a candidate fault pool involved canvassing the
various sources of such information. These included: 1) faults used by NASA
in evaluating Faultfinder modules and related research (Ref. 6); 2) ASRS
incident reports; 3) Boeing safety data on Boeing planes with advanced
cockpits; and 4) flight test data from Boeing propulsion groups. This produced
a substantial list of events on which to carry out the initial screening task. For
many of the events, particularly those taken from ASRS reports, information
on the nature of the fault was so sketchy as to make the instance of no value for
the project.
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When faults were evaluated for availability of real engine data on which to base
fault propagation, the candidate pool quickly shrank to those faults identified
by Boeing propulsion groups. No other source could provide both real engine
fault data plus matching normal simulated data generated under the same
flight conditions. Both these types of data are required to test the monitoring
and diagnostic modules. Thus, a much reduced but realistic candidate fault
pool was generated.
Initially, a quantitative approach to fault symptom representation was
planned. However, proprietary issues, which are dealt with later in this
report, precluded the inclusion of quantitative data as a part of the deliverable
reports on the project. Therefore, the quantitative engine data was used as
input to MONITAUR in module development and testing but only qualitative
representations are included in the deliverables.
The scoping process as defined above was carried out over several months
rather than the originally scheduled one month period in order to include all
possible faults for which data sources could be identified. This did not affect
progress on the project because an iterative approach to fault scenario
development was employed. Implementation of the iterative approach meant
that data gathering, scenario development, and information requirements
analysis activities could proceed in parallel without having to wait on the
completion of any one task.
The Technical Monitor was kept apprised of the progress and results of
activities in this task and had the opportunity to provide inputs regarding
specific priorities and preferences.
2.3 TASK 3 - Hm_w_ftware Selection
Several potential candidate hardware platforms were evaluated for the Flight
Deck Engine Advisor. These included
PC 386
Apollo Workstation
Symbolics
McIvory Workstation
MacII
In addition, Common LISP and NEXPERT OBJECT were considered as
software development environments. Each component of Faultfinder
(MONITAUR, DRAPhyS STAGE1 and STAGE2) was evaluated separately
because they were originally developed with differing dependencies. The goal
was to be able to link all three modules for a run-time version at project
completion. Criteria for selection (as discussed in the Detailed Program Plan)
included:
Portability from NASA to Boeing
Interface with Simulator
Interface with Engine Model
Real Time Performance/Response
Cost to Implement at Boeing
Cost to Implement at NASA
Impact on Productivity
Each applicable criterion will be discussed in context with the specific module
discussed.
2.3.1 MONITAUR D_velopment
The development of enhancements to MONITAUR was performed on a 386 PC
using GCLISP Developer software. This development was completed using the
3.1 version of the GCLISP Developer. A 4.0 version of the GCLISP Developer
became available during the first quarter 1991, but this was too late to be
utilized effectively on this contract. There are several advantages to both ?
NASA and Boeing in the choice of development environment. These are
summarized below.
NASA advantages include the following:
1. NASA has a GCLISP implementation hosted on a PC in their
experimental airplane. This will facilitate the transition to inflight
testing.
2. A greater number of potential users will be able to utilize the PC version
since more engineers have PCs on their desks than LISP Workstations.
This will facilitate dissemination of the product of this study.
3. GCLISP boasts a Steele compatibility and is upward portable to other
Common LISP environments.
4. No additional expense will be incurred, since NASA already owns
GCLISP.
5. GCLISP is available in both interpretive and compiled mode to allow
both efficient development and better run-time performance.
6. Porting MONITAUR from Genera Common LISP to GCLISP was
relatively straight forward since few special Genera features have been
used in MONITAUR. This allowed more time for fault information
development.
Boeing advantages include:_.
1. Boeing owns GCLISP so no additional costs will be incurred.
2. GCLISP on a 386 PC is compatible with Flight Deck Research's
MicroCab architecture so the Engine Advisor can be integrated with
existing applications
3. GCLISP is portable to other Common LISP environments used at
Boeing.
4. GCLISP is available in both interpretive and compiled mode to allow
both efficient development and better run-time performance.
5. Porting MONITAUR from Genera Common LISP to GCLISP was
relatively straight forward since few special Genera features have been
used in MONITAUR. This allowed more time for fault information
development.
There are some disadvantages in the selection as well. Most important among
these is run-time performance. Even using the compiled form of GCLISP,
execution times on a 33Mhz PC will not be in the order of real time processing
unless time slices are taken several seconds apart. A second disadvantage of
selecting a PC instead of an APOLLO, is the need to create an interface
between engine model data generated on an APOLLO and the PC. If an
APOLLO had been chosen as the development hardware, this would be an
internal link which should be more easily developed.
2.3.2 DRAPhyS STAGE1 Development
The development of enhancements to MONITAUR was performed on a 386 PC
also using GCLISP Developer software. This development was completed
using the 3.1 version of the GCLISP Developer. There are several advantages
to both NASA and Boeing which are summarized below.
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NASA advantages include the following:
1. Since the selection is identical to that for MONITAUR, all six of the
advantages cited in the MONITAUR evaluation apply to STAGE1 as
_t
well.
2. In addition, the compatibility between MONITAUR and STAGE1
resulted in efficient linkage between the modules. NASA's current
blackboard was replaced with a PC compatible implementation.
Boeing advantages include:
1. Since the selection is identical to that for MONITAUR, all five of the
advantages cited in he MONITAUR evaluation apply to STAGE1 as well.
2. In addition, the compatibility between MONITAUR and STAGE1
resulted in efficient linkage between the modules. NASA's current
blackboard was replaced with a PC compatible implementation.
The performance disadvantages of a 386 PC platform with GCLISP are similar •.
to those cited for MONITAUR. When the two modules run sequentially, the
performance is degraded. No additional penalty exists for interfacing to
APOLLO, since the STAGE1 module does not have engine model input.
In addition to a PC 386 GCLISP implementation, a second option was
investigated as an alternative for STAGE1 processing. A demonstration of
STAGE1 processing using NEXPERT OBJECT was produced for alternatives
analysis. A separate set of potential advantages was evaluated including:
For NASA:
1. Develop experience with a commercial shell, one that is emerging as a
front runner in the AI community.
?
2. Create a viable alternative to allow tractable rule base processing.
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3. Other potential NASA._customers will have this shell so dissemination
will be more efficient.
4. Boeing has considerable experience with this development environment,
so productivity will be in'ceased.
5. The knowledge bases developed in a shell are highly portable within
NEXPERT OBJECT applications.
For Boeing:
1. Boeing owns NEXPERT OBJECT, so no additional sol, ware costs will be
incurred.
2. Other AI applications have been developed in Flight Deck Research, so
this version will be highly compatible.
3. Reasoning is traceable in NEXPERT OBJECT, which is important for
Verification and Validation required for FAA certification.
The disadvantages in NEXPERT OBJECT use is the additional cost to NASA to
obtain NEXPERT OBJECT, and NASA's lack of familiarity with this
development tool.
2.3.3 DRAPhvS STAGE2 Development
The development of enhancements to DRAPhyS STAGE2 was performed on the
McIvory workstation using Genera Common LISP. To allow for PC
compatibility, Boeing investigated the feasibility of porting the product to a PC
386 using the CLOE implementation of LISP produced by Symbolics.
NASA advantages include the following:
1. NASA has all hardware and software in place, therefore no additional
cost will be incurred.
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2. This is NASA's original development environment, so they have a broad
experience bas_.
3. The symbolics will give better run-time performance than a PC.
4. The PC porting under CLOE was demonstrated, and the product is
usable by a wide variety of NASA customers.
?
Boeing advantages include:
1. The PC porting under CLOE was demonstrated, and the product is
compatible with other Flight Deck Research applications in the
MicroCab.
The disadvantages of this selection include a productivity penalty for working
on the McIvory due to lack of familiarity for Boeing personnel. Boeing has
incurred additional cost in securing a McIvory for production use. Finally, the
product is not portable from McIvory to the PC by any means but CLOE LISP
translation. No graphics can be translated under the current version of CLOE.
The functional portion of STAGE2 was ported, but the interface had to be
redeveloped for the PC version.
2.4 TASK 4 - Fault Scenario Selection
2.4.1 En_ne Model Selection
Criteria for the selection of an engine model for use in this project were
developed as a part of preparation of the Detailed Program Plan. These
criteria were applied to several engine models which have been developed by
Boeing for implementation on flight simulators. This section of the report
deals with a discussion of proprietary issues and their resolution plus the
details of the engine and fault selection processes.
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2.4.1.1 Proprietary Issues -_
At the present time, no written proprietary agreement exists between Boeing
and NASA which adequately protects the proprietary rights of engine
i.
manufacturers and other parties with vested interests in the engine model
and/or real engine data which are being used to carry out some of the tasks of
this project should an engine model and the quantitative fault data be delivered
to NASA. Further, no permission has been granted by parties with vested
interest in the real data to release such data to a third party. Neither an
engine model nor real engine data are deliverables under the contract
Statement of Work as written, This situation does not in any way preclude
Boeing from performing on the contract. The Technical Monitor had indicated
early in the process of developing the Detailed Program Plan for this project
that having an engine model and real engine data included in the Final Report
would be a plus for their related in-house work. However, the nature of the
engine data and the number of parties with vested interest involved are such
that no attempt was made on the current contract to secure proprietary
agreements or permission to release data covering engine parameters on the
faults analyzed or any quantitative output from the engine model which
reflects this data. Qualitative representations of engine parameter
characteristics during fault propagation will be described in the Final Report.
In light of the above, it is Boeing's intention to deliver qualitative
representations of engine parameter characteristics during fault propagation
as a part of the Final Report, but no quantitative data will be included.
Attempts to resolve proprietary issues on the engine model and engine data
are continuing with respect to follow on work on the Flight Deck Engine
Advisor program.
2.4.1.2 Model Selection Process
Engine models considered in this selection process represent classes of
engines used on Boeing airplanes. The search for a suitable engine model was
restricted to models of engines currently implemented in Boeing flight
simulators for three reasons. First, this restriction is required because of the
necessity to run the model in order to process inputs and provide outputs
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necessary to develo p and implement fault scenarios. Engine models which
come from the engin_ manufacturers are not implemented in this sense. The
programming effort required to implement engine models for simulation is far
beyond the resources of the present project. Hence, no consideration was given
to using new engine models not already implemented. Second, the expertise
needed to utilize the simulation models to provide the fault propagation
information on the engine faults is available in house. Third, real engine data
are available in-house on the sample of engines considered. Any engine model
which did not have the aforementioned characteristics could not be given
serious consideration within the scope of the project.
In order to avoid proprietary issues and constraints while documenting project
activities or results, no identification will be made of specific engines or classes
of engines by engine manufacturer at any time during the discussion of the
selection process or in any subsequent discussions relating to engine models.
Engine models will henceforth be referred to as Models A, B, C, and D. Since
each model is a different engine type and possibly a different engine
manufacturer, separate Physical Systems Files (PSF) were created for each
model. The only PSFs included in this report are those for which real engine
._ data was obtained. In the process of developing fault scenarios, no attempt
was made to restrict the fault selection to a specific (serial number) engine.
The associated PSF has not been customized for a specific (serial number)
engine, but instead is intended to represent any serial number engine of that
type, and hence is generic for that engine type.
The criteria used in the engine selection process are described below as a
prelude to the description of the selection process and results. The criterion
labels are those used in Figure 2 to facilitate interpretation of the data.
Model Availability: This refers to the availability within Boeing of an
implemented model for a particular class of engines which can be utilized
with little or no modification.
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Model Validationl: Refers t_%he fact that the engine model is known to run
without problems and'has been demonstrated to match the engine it
represents.
Proprietary Protection: Proprietary protection for all parties can be assured
and permission to transfer data to a third party can be obtained.
Real En_ne Data: The extent ofinflight and test data available on faults
which might be selected for scenario development. This criterion also refers to
the ease with which fault data from other engines can be modified to work in
concert with the model. (This criterion and that of "availability of failure
mode data" listed in the Detailed Program Plan are redundant.)
Arcuracy, etc.: This refers to whether the accuracy, consistency, stability, and
tolerances of the engine model are within acceptable ranges.
Propagation Information: This refers to the availability of expertise on fault
propagation within and beyond the engine. High ratings were given when the
needed expertise was available within Boeing.
Change Information Available: This refers to the availability of information
on changes made to the engine manufacturer's model to adapt it for
simulation.
Computing Requirements: This refers to the type and amount of
hardware/software support needed to run the model. Specifically, can the
model be run on the types of hardware/software combinations being considered
for the project, and if not, how much effort would be required to translate the
model. A low rating indicates the required hardware platform is not readily
• available to the project and/or a large effort would be required to translate the
model to a more accessible platform.
1 This criterion label has been used in place of "Simulator Ready" which appeared in the
Detailed Program Plan because it better reflects the basis for judgements on this dimension.
Simulator Ready was deemed to overlap _oo greatly with "Model Availability"as defined
above.
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Propulsion experts thoroughly familiar with the characteristics of all engine
models under conside_ration evaluated the models in terms of the criteria
described above. Additional factors to be mentioned later were also taken into
consideration in making the final determination as to which model to use.
The results of this evaluation represent a consensus of expert opinion.
Figure 2 represents a Criteria by Engine Model matrix with the weights used
for each criterion shown in the second column. The first three criteria were
considered critical. Thus, a weight of 0 or 1 was used in a cutoff mode. This
meant that if an engine model received a weight of 0 on any one of there three
criteria it was dropped from any further consideration. The remaining
criteria could receive weights ranging from 1 to 5. The values shown in the
i matrix cells represent a rating arrived at by consensus among the propulsion
simulation experts. These weights were simply added up across criteria
within engine models. The model with the highest total was chosen for use on
the project. This choice was further substantiated by additional factors.
As can be seen, Engine Model A has the best showing across the criteria used.
In addition, this model is implemented as a FORTRAN callable subroutine on
:_ the Apollo computer using the Boeing Parallel Simulation System (PSIM).
The PSIM is software which facilitates integration of other analysis tools or
simulations. The other models do not use the PSIlYI software, and some run
on other computers such as the Harris. The model for Engine A also runs as a
multi-engine model. None of the other models have this capability. This
feature will have little impact on the current project work, but will make the
simulation of differential engine performance much easier in the future.
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• "-Candidate Engines
Criteria Weight A B C D
Model Availability 0-1 1 1 1 1
Model Validation ,. 0-1 1 0 0 0
Proprietary Protection 2 0-1
Real Engine Data 1-5 5 2 5 4
,,,, , ,i
Accuracy, etc. 1-5 4 4.5 1 2
Propagation Information 1-5 5 3 2 1
Change Information available 1-5 5 5 5 5
Computing Requirements 1-5 2 2 2
i i
Evaluation Score 25 17.5 16 15
Figure 2. Engine By Criteria Evaluation Matrix
2.4.2 Fault Selection
A set of candidate faults has been identified for use in developing fault
scenarios. The strong points of the subset identified to date are: a) real engine
data exist for them, and b) the expertise for specifying fault propagation
sequences is available in-house. The characteristics (referred to as criteria in
the Detailed Program Plan) which the faults should have in order to be
maximally useful are listed below with brief descriptions.
Credibility: Real engine fault propagation data are available on the fault.
Within Engine: The fault propagation sequence is constrained to components
within the engine subsystem.
Between Subsystems: The fault propagates functionally or physically to related
or proximate subsystems.
Data Availability: Quantitative data are readily available on the fault in a
useable format.
2 This criterion could not be met by any of the engine model candidates so it was given no
weight in the selection process. (See also Section 2.4.1.1)
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Propagation Expertise: The expertise needed to develop the fault propagation
sequence is readily available and accessible.
Doable: Scenario development is doable within project resource and schedule
constraints if the fault is selected.
Action Required: Dealing with the fault must call for action on the part of the
crew, be it subsystem reconfiguration or control, or crew awareness for
inflight replanning.
Trend. Inconsistency: The fault propagation occurs over considerable time so
as to generate negative trends in engine parameters which may not break a
threshold for some time. The fault produces inconsistencies in expected
engine parameter values.
Accurat_ Time Data: Accurate time line data are available to support fault
propagation scenario development. The minimum requirement here is for
accurate sequence data.
Figure 3 represents a Characteristic by Fault Candidate matrix which
illustrates the coverage of characteristics achieved across the fault scenario
developed.
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Characteristics _ Candidate Faults
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
Credibility X, X X X X X X X
Within engine X X X X X X X
Between subsystems X ,
Data availability X X X X X X X X
Propagation expertise X X X X X X X X
Doable X X X X X X X X
Action required X X X X X X X X
Trend, inconsistency X* X X
Accurate time data X X X X X X X X
E,ntio.S,e I 1Sl Sl 81 7 I 71 7
Figure 3. Characteristic By Fault Candidate Matrix
*
Trend occurs across scenarios F3, F4, F5
2.4.2.1 Fault Candidates
The following candidates were identified. As can be seen in Figure 3, when
taken together, they contain all of the characteristics outlined above.
F1 - Malfunctioning fuel metering unit - Hung Start, ground /
F2 - Fuel boost pump failure - Flame out /
F3 - Ice damaged fan blades, light - Thrust Shortfall
F4 - Ice damaged fan blades, moderate - Thrust Shortfall
F5 - Ice damaged fan blades, heavy - Thrust Shortfall
F6 - Foreign Object Damage (FOD): volcanic ash - Flame out
F7 - Fuel nozzle coking - Hung Start, air
F8 - Stability margin problem - Stall/Surge
All of the above fault candidates were eventually developed as fault scenarios.
The resulting scenarios are contained in Appendix A.
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2.5 TASK 5 - Fault Scenario Development
Early in the course of the project, it was determined that an iterative approach
to the tasks of fault selection, scenario development, and information
requirements identification would be most effective. Thus as real engine data
became available on a fault, the process of developing the contents of the fault 4
scenario began. As this process proceeded, the concepts and definitions
structuring the scenario contents were fleshed out and modified. It was also
at this time that it became obvious that the identification of information
requirements needed to carry out fault detection and diagnosis was an integral
part of fault scenario development. Therefore, the information requirements
task was folded into scenario development and scheduling of the project tasks
was modified to reflect the iterative nature of the overall scenario development
process.
Eight (8) fault scenarios were developed during the course of the study. All
eight are included in their entirety as Appendix A of this report.
2.5.1 Concepts and Definitions for Structuring Fault Scenarios and the
lnfQrm_tion Requirements Analysis
The framework for diagnosing faults is the fault propagation sequence
expressed in terms of system components involved and the functional and/or
physical relationships affected. The framework for analyzing pilot
information requirements is the event-fault-context-action alternative
relationship which exists in a specific fault scenario. Depending on the fault
and context variables relevant to the scenario, context may be used in two
ways; as an aid in diagnosing faults, and in terms of its impact on action
alternative selection. Before discussing the nature of these relationships and
the format and content of a fault scenario, we should define the terms and
components to be used.
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2.5.1.1 Definitions ..
Events - Events are those conditions which the crew must deal with. They are
the end result of a propagation of malfunctioning components. The
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propagation may be functional, physical, or both. Examples of events are:
flameout; hung start; thrust shortfall; excessive vibration.
Faul_ - The fault is the failure of an engine component which propagates
through the engine subsystem and via this propagation results in an event.
Examples of faults are: sensor failures, valve open/close failures, software
logic failures or inadequacies; any mechanical, electrical, or software
component failure; procedural failures (both maintenance and operational).
Faults in the new engines may be mechanical, electrical, or software related,
or may be flight crew or maintenance induced. For any given event, it is
assumed that there can be multiple potential faults. Faults may be grouped in
terms of the crew action alternatives; i.e., several faults may map onto a single
crew action such as "Shut down engine for remainder of flight". It is also
assumed that different faults will have at least slight differences (either
temporal or sequential) in the way they propagate. Thus, if the propagation
sequence and temporal relationships are known, the nature of the fault can be
inferred with some degree of accuracy. The degree of accuracy in
differentiating among faults will be a function of the number and degree of
differences in their propagation sequences. However, if faults have essentially
the same propagation sequence and/or the same action alternative is
appropriate, no attempt is made to differentiate among them. These are said
to belong to the same Fault/Action Class.
Context - This refers to external variables which may: a) affect the way a fault
propagates, b) affect the criticality of the fault and hence the crew action
alternatives, or c) alter the appropriateness of crew actions. These variables
include: phase of flight, weather, airplane systems status, engine fault
history, engine commanded status, airline policy, FARs, pilot error, workload.
, As mentioned earlier, context variables may play two roles. Variable status
may be used to aid the diagnostic process as well as influence the relevance of
action alternatives. Context variable status can eliminate potential fault
alternatives as well as make others more viable.
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The relationship of coittext variables to action alternatives is an IF-THEN
relationship. If certain variables are operative, then a particular action
alternative is appropriate. If the variable(s) is(are) not operative, then there is
no impact on action alternatives'. In other cases, the context variable(s) may
have no affect on the action alternatives whether operative or not. In any
event, the relevant context variables must be considered in the diagnostic
process in order to produce relevant recommendations on action alternatives.
The event-fault-context-action alternative relationship is illustrated in Figure
4. Within this framework, context variables may be thought of as filters which
may or may not be in place for a given fault.
Crow Acticn Alternatives - These define, at least to a category level, the actions
the flight crew might take when confronted with an event precipitated by the
occurrence of a particular fault within a Fault/Action class. It is assumed
that action alternatives can be related to faults or Fault/Action classes via
context variables. Examples of action alternatives might be: shut down engine
for duration of flight; engine shutdown with possibility of restart later in flight
•, (delay unspecified at present); execute engine shutdown/restart procedures;
reduce throttle setting but continue to operate engine; restart engine
immediately and continue to operate normally; no action required (a pseudo
problem). The set of potential alternative actions will vary somewhat from
event to event.
Symptoms - The manifestation of the fault in system parameters against a
time base represents the symptoms of the fault. These symptoms are defined,
for the most part, in terms of engine parameters such as low rotor speed, high
rotor speed, EGT, fuel flow (FF). However, other symptoms which are not
sensed or are not displayed in the cockpit, or both may be relevant to the
diagnosis of faults. An attempt will be made to identify such symptoms or
infer their existence if possible.
Impact on Other Subsystems - Faults within the engines may eventually affect
other subsystems such as generators and hydraulic systems. These impacts
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are noted in the fault scenario but unless they are important to the diagnosis of
the fault, they will noi;°be included in the propagation sequence per se.
Time Base - All fault candidates being analyzed have flight recorder data on\
engine parameters plotted against a time base; usually at .1 second intervals.
This time base is taken as relative for purposes of analysis since it would differ
in detail across engines and within engines across time or fault occurrences.
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2.5.1.2 Fault Scenario Sections
%
Each section of the fault scenario is identified below along with a description of
its contents. Because the fault scenario development process is iterative, the
only sections in which the information is not subject to change are Event and
Fault. All others can be revised during review and knowledge base
development. Revisions in the fault scenario data base were made as long as
the need for more and better data continued during knowledge base
development.
Event - contains only the name of the event.
Faul_ - contains a descriptive label of the specific fault being analyzed plus any
qualifying or modifying information.
Potential Fault Alternatives - contains a list of other faults which could lead to
the same event. This list was expanded as additional alternatives became
known, but is not exhaustive.
Relevant Context Variables/Status - contains a list of the relevant context
variables and their particular status or "value" for the scenario. Initially, the
relevancy of particular context variables per se or their relevance as a function
of particular values they might assume may not be known. Thus, the listing
for a particular fault scenario may change as knowledge base development
progresses. Context variables identified to date are listed below along with
examples to illustrate the status or value these variables might assume.
Phase of Flight - Take Off; Initial Climb; Cruise; Descent; Approach;
Landing; Go-Around.
Weather - Clear and dry; Heavy rain; Icing; Turbulence; etc.
FOD Potential - Several scenarios involve foreign object damage of one
sort or another as the fault. Examples include; ice damage, volcanic
ash damage, bird strikes, blown tire piece ingestion.
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Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) - relative to constraints or options
pilots have in specific situations.
Engine Fault History - Information on whether the particular engine or
engine type has a history of the fault/event occurrence and how it has
been resolved in the past.
Airline Policy - Specific actions may be dictated for specific events.
Other context variables may or may not interact to affect prescribed
actions.
Engine Commanded Status - Steady State; Acceleration; Deceleration;
Start; Shutdown; Forward/Reverse Thrust.
Pilot Error - Procedural errors can be made which are in themselves
faults in that they will produce events; e.g., improper start procedures
can produce a hung start. However, pilot error can also exacerbate a
fault and alter the appropriateness of particular action alternatives. For
example, at one time certain engines would flame out when significant
amounts of water in the form of rainfall were ingested. If the pilots
reacted immediately, the correct action was to immediately execute the
restart procedure. If the pilots did not react immediately or they moved
the throttles, the only action alternative lei_ was to shut down the engine
for the duration of the flight. It is in this latter sense that pilot error is a
context variable.
Airplane System Status - Basically, this refers to what is working on the
airplane and what is not. Airplanes may be dispatched with certain
components or subsystems inoperative if they are not critical to flight
safety. An air conditioning pack might be an example.
Workload - This refers to the aggregate demands on the flight crew in
addition to those imposed by the event. It can be assumed that workload
will be high during certain phases of flight (e.g., take off and initial
climb; approach and landing) and lower at others (e.g., cruise).
However, the correlation is not perfect. Workload can be expected to
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influence the relevanay of action alternatives; particularly when it is
high. "
Crew Action Alternatives - contains a listing of all action alternatives
appropriate for the event under any circumstance. Options are determined in
consultation with engineering and/or training pilots and propulsion experts.
An objective is to have this section and that on potential fault alternatives mesh
well in that all action alternatives are identified for the fault alternatives listed.
Subsystems Affected - contains a list of the subsystems involved in the
propagation sequence. Subsystems which may be affected by the event but are
not crucial to the diagnostic process are also identified and effects noted.
These latter subsystems will not be mentioned in the fault propagation
sequence.
Propagation Sequence with Rank Order Time Base - The propagation sequence
is described in qualitative terms against a rank-ordered time base.
Components and engine parameters are identified in the sequence in which
they are affected by the fault. Qualitative values are given for the parameters.
Each point on the time base when components become involved or parameter
values change is labelled consecutively so that the order in which involvement
and/or change occurs is apparent.
Data Pilots Have Available - This section represents an attempt to identify and
evaluate the sources and sequence of data acquisition pilots currently use in
diagnosing the fault under analysis. It provides the basis for an evaluation of
what could or should be expected of pilots when compared with the data from
the next section. Subsections include:
Source(s) of Data
Explanation of Relationships
Quality of Data
Heuristics or Rules of Thumb Used
Time Constraints
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Information Required to M_ke Diagnosis - This represents a generic
description of the information required to make a diagnosis in that it does not
distinguish between what information the diagnostic module would use versus
what pilots might use. It will, however, contain comments relevant to
whether pilots currently have dh adequate source, if any, of information
needed to make the diagnosis. This section, the propagation sequence, and the
context variables/status provide the data base for knowledge base development
on a fault. Subsections include:
Key Parameters
Symptoms
Interpretation
Information Required .for Decision Aiding - This section contains an analysis
of the relationship between fault and action alternatives given the relevant
context variables and their status. Subsections include:
Nature of the Fault
Relevant Context Variable Set
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables
Diagnostic Application
Action Recommendation Application
Consequences of Inappropriate Alternative Actions
Information is included in the subsections of these last three sections if and
when it is available. A comment section may also be included when the
analyst feels it is appropriate to provide additional information.
2.5.2 Lessons Learned in Fault _cenari0 Development
2.5.2.1 Data Availability
With two exceptions, fault scenarios were based on flight test data. In all but
two of the scenarios based on flight test data, the fault was induced in order to
study the effects. This is typical of flight test data. The fact that we have data
of such granularity on two uninduced faults is fortuitous. For the staged
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faults such as flame out duejto fuel pump failure, the fault itself is not
necessarily low probability but very special circumstances have to obtain in
order for it to propagate to the event which occurred.
The faults represented are not _omplex (particularly in terms of the
propagation sequence), they are never multiple, and they are certainly not
novel. If novel faults are defined as those which have not occurred, then of
course we will never have them in our data base. This does not mean that we
cannot eventually devise a system which would recognize them as faults, at
least at some level of specificity relative to actions required by the pilots.
A number of faults were known to have occurred, but for various reasons the
detailed engine parameter data was not available. These included:
Flame Out in Idle Descent - electronic engine controller fault;
Hung Start, Ground - bleed valve out of position;
Engine Overspeed - electronic engine controller fault.
The first would have been an excellent example of a subtle fault. The second,
would have allowed us to compare hung starts produced by fuel management
vs. pneumatic problems. The third is an example of unalerted automation
failure requiring crew intervention.
Clearly, we need an expanded fault data base for feasibility testing and for
longer range development efforts. Some additional fault data will be available
through further efforts to mine the flight test data files. Also needed however
is additional operational data on both faults and normal operating engines.
An expansion of the rationale for these needs is provided in the next subsection
and in the section on Knowledge Base Development. An effort to identify
sources, extent, and accessibility of a greatly expanded operational data base is
proposed for follow on to the present study. Preliminary inquiries in this area
indicate that the airlines probably would be the major source for such a data
base; more so, surprisingly, than engine manufacturers.
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2.5.2.2 Nature of the Data
Six of the fault scenarios developed are based on flight test data. The
remaining two are based on data taken on a flight deck recorder. There are
major differences between flighf test data and operational data in terms of
parameters recorded and granularity of the data. It is instructive to note the
differences between these two data sources and the implications for system
development.
Flight tests are typically very heavily instrumented in order to: a) get the most
data for the money, and b) obtain the clearest picture possible of the way
various engine parameters behave during the event observed. Further, the
data recordings are quite brief (at least in terms of data retained for storage),
typically lasting no more than 100 seconds. Thus, the only trend data available
is of very short duration. Operational data, on the other hand, has the
potential of covering a much longer time span but fewer parameters are
measured and the data is much courser.
Parameters pertaining to internal engine pressures and temperatures are
very useful in anticipating the onset of an event such as a surge, but the high
fidelity sensors which provide the data during flight test are also very fragile
and thus are unacceptable on operational engines. Another type of problem
encountered was having data available on a parameter, but not having the
parameter modelled in the engine model. Vibration is a case in point. Until
engine manufacturers can provide a reliable and meaningful measure of
vibration, this valuable diagnostic parameter will not be available. This is
particularly frustrating in the case of the ice damage scenarios. Here a step
increase in vibration level is the only reliable symptom indicating foreign
object damage has occurred at low levels of damage.
There is also the situation where engine parameters are measured and are
among the inputs the electronic engine controller uses but the parameter
values are not available outside the controller. These parameter values could
be made available to a data bus if a system like the Flight Deck Engine Advisor
were available to use them. Therefore, it is appropriate to use data from flight
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test engine measurements t9 anticipate parameter values which may be
available to the diagnostic process on future operational engines.
There is some pressure from engine manufacturers to reduce the number of
engine sensors. This is understandable in that sensors do fail and can
produce false alarms which can be costly under engine warranties. However,
a reduction in sensors would be counterproductive from a diagnostic
standpoint. Through sophisticated conditional processing with a reliable
engine advisor system, the additional sensor data could be acquired and used
while at the same time lowering the false alarm rate below current levels.
The data base survey task included in proposed follow on efforts would address
the problems identified here.
2.5.2.3 Analysis of Information Requirements
There are three levels or types of analyses of information requirements related
to the development of fault management systems. There is a top level analysis
of fault management functions as they relate to other functional categories
covering all air crew functions. NASA is supporting research in this area on
other contracts. At the most detailed and specific level, there is the analysis of
information required to diagnose faults. The results of this level of analysis
could apply to either pilot information requirements or system information
requirements. System information requirements represent the inputs needed
in knowledge base development for engine monitoring and diagnosis activities
carried out by an engine advisor system. Most of the effort in analyzing
information requirements on the current project was focused at this level. A
third type of information requirements analysis focuses on the type of
information pilots need to make decisions about appropriate action to take
given a particular fault/event combination. A conceptual framework for the
analysis of this third type of information requirement was developed as a part
of the present project. A description of the framework and results to date are
contained in the next section.
The information requirements analysis for the present study was data base
driven. This meant that the analysis had to focus on specific faults for which
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real engine data was available. There was little opportunity to expand the
analysis to other faults beyond listing potential alternative faults which might
lead to the same event. The number of such alternatives varied considerably
across fault/event combinations. Being data driven also meant that we were
forced to exclude several faults' we would have liked to analyze for their
contribution to the study of fault management but could not for lack of data.
Examples of such faults were given earlier in the discussion of fault selection.
The propagation sequence contained in the fault scenarios provided the basic
inputs to the information requirements analysis. From this, an evaluation
was made of the data that pilots have available without the aid of a Flight Deck
Engine Advisor system. The quality of the data, pilot heuristics relevant to the
fault, and any time constraints were also addressed. Information required to
make a diagnosis was then analyzed. This served two purposes. It provided
the core data required in knowledge base development and provided a basis for
determining how much of a gap exists between information needs and
information available. Little time was spent addressing this gap. To do so
would have required an analysis involving the systematic consideration of
context variables and level of automation. This was clearly beyond the scope of
the present study.
Because context variables can be useful in the diagnostic process as well as in
decision making regarding alternative courses of action, subsections were
included to address the application of context information to both diagnosis
and action selection. The conceptual framework for application to action
selection is discussed in detail in the next section.
The complete text of each fault scenario developed is contained in Appendix A.
It will be noted that the amount of information varies considerably across
scenarios. This variation occurs for two reasons; the nature of the fault, and
the availability of background data. Some faults such as "Hung Start-Ground"
have a wealth of potential fault alternatives, a relatively slow propagation of
the fault's effects, a clear key parameter in diagnosis, and straightforward
relationships between context variables and action alternatives. Others such
as "All Engine Flame out" which are based on flight data recorder output have
a much more limited data base on which to draw for analysis.
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The major limitation of the total fault scenario data base at present is the lack
of comparable fault/event combinations for reliability checking and the lack of
different fault/same event combinations to assess ability to distinguish among
faults. The need for distinctior_s among faults must be determined in an
analysis of the relationship between fault/event combinations, relevant context
variables, and the resulting action alternative options. Such an analysis is
proposed for a follow on effort.
2.5.3 Event/Fault/Context/Action Relationships
Understanding the event/fault/context/action relationships in fault detection
and diagnosis is critical to designing the knowledge base to deal with them.
This section provides a generic outline of the concepts being implemented in
the Flight Deck Engine Advisor development effort. Most of the terms to be
used have been defined in preceding sections. This section deals with the
relationships. When specific examples are needed to illustrate points in this
discussion, reference will be made to the Hung Start-Ground scenario in
Appendix A.
Figure 5 will provide a generic framework for the discussion of concepts and
relationships. It also represents an attempt to illustrate what is meant by the
"mapping of faults onto action alternatives". Events are used as the
organizing concept in describing the relationship between faults, context
variables, and action alternatives within a fault scenario. The event is shown
on the lei_ as in Figure 4 even though, in a propagation sense, faults precede
events.
Two additional terms are introduced in Figure 5 which need to be defined.
Faul_ category_ is introduced at this point as an organizing concept. It may or
may not play a role in rule-base development. Examples of these categories
can be found in the Hung Start-Ground scenario under "Potential Fault
Alternatives". For the hung start, they include pneumatic system failures,
fuel system failures, procedure failures, etc. Context variable set refers to the
context variables relevant to a fault and the status or value of each variable.
With this definition, if one value for one variable in the set were to change, a
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new set would be defined. This implies that the mapping of faults to action
alternatives could change with the change of one value for one variable.
Probably the best example of this are changes in phase of flight.
The reader may refer to the con_ents of the Hung Start-Ground scenario for
examples of everything shown in Figure 5. However, it should be noted that
there is no correspondence intended between fault category letters, fault
numbers, or action alternative labels and the actual material in the scenario.
As can be seen, there are many faults which can produce the same event. The
fault categories are used as an organizing concept in scenario development. It
may be that most if not all faults within a category would map to a single
action alternative thus forming a Fault/Action class.
The concept of Fault/Action Classes is one introduced to reduce complexity in
defining the relationship between faults and action alternatives. For example,
the line connections in Figure 5 show faults 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 mapping onto
action alternative Able. These faults would then constitute a Fault/Action
class. This means that if any one of these faults occurred within the
framework of a specific context variable set, the appropriate action alternative
would be the same. Thus, diagnosis need only proceed to the point where the
appropriate Fault/Action class has been identified. Other connections are
shown between faults and action alternatives to illustrate that faults in a
particular category may also map to very different action alternatives. The
relationships depicted between faults in Category D and the action alternatives
illustrate this situation.
The wavy line descending from Context Variable Set through the fault/action
connections is used to indicate that the pattern of connections may change
considerably with different context variable sets. For example, changing
phase of flight might have considerable effect on the mapping. It may become
more complex, or in very high workload conditions may become highly
simplified with only one or at most two alternatives being appropriate.
So far, the picture suggests the potential for overwhelming complexity. It also
suggests the myriad of factors which may or may not, should or should not
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influence the pilots' decision making process. As more real data are collected,
the actual level of complexity to be dealt with will become clearer.
Testing of the overall concept was not possible during the present contract due
to a lack of appropriate data. We would like to exercise the MONITAUR and
DRAPhyS modules with two different faults which result in a hung start (one
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Generic Illustration Of The Event-Fault-Context-ActionRelationship
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involving the fuel system and one the pneumatic system) during follow on
work. If the monitoring and diagnostic modules can distinguish between the
two (should such distinction be appropriate), we will have taken an important
step in demonstrating the feasibility of the overall concept.
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Eventually we hope to be able to demonstrate the role of context variables in
diagnosis by using rules based on context variable sets to prune fault
hypotheses in the STAGE1 diagnostic phase. As we gain knowledge about
fault-fault and fault-action relationships, it may be possible to identify
Fault/Action classes which are stable across most if not all context variable
sets. It may also be possible to reduce the complexity of the knowledge base
development process by pruning very low probability faults from consideration.
These complexity reducing activities will remain as future research
possibilities.
To date, the beginnings of a data base on the relationship between fault/event
combinations, context variables, and appropriate action alternatives has been
included at the end of each fault scenario. Pilot information requirements for
fault category management and flight planning would be an output of the
context analysis proposed for a follow on effort. Specific requirements will be a
function of the event/fault/context/action relationships and level of automation
in systems affected by the fault.
2.6 TASK 6- Identification of Pilot Information Requirements
The task of analyzing information requirements was fully integrated into the
fault scenario development process. A distinction between types of information
requirements analysis was made in Section 2.5.2.3 to clarify the activities
accomplished under the present contract and to relate these activities to other
types of information requirements. Rationale for the type of information
requirements analysis conducted was also included. The various categories of
information developed and lessons learned in its compilation were also covered
in that section. A further discussion of pilot information requirements was
included in Section 2.5.3.
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2.7 TASK 7 -Knowledge Bas@Development
The Detailed Program Plan called for a minimum of effort expended on
MONITAUR with a bulk of the development assigned to enhancement of
DRAPhyS. Following the conversion of MONITAUR to GCLISP, several
problems were encountered while modifying MONITAUR to accept the Boeing
data and engine model. Initial efforts to generate symptoms consistent with
those identified by propulsion experts using real fault data have emphasized to
Boeing developers the importance of MONITAUR's output to the entire
diagnostic process. For this reason more emphasis has been placed on
MONITAUR development than was originally anticipated. The goal was to
identify and solve all issues required to produce accurate symptoms of Boeing
supplied faults. The result of more effort expended on MONITAUR is less
development completed for DRAPhyS. This reprioritization of effort was
coordinated with and approved by the Technical Monitor. The details will be
discussed by module below.
2.7.1 Work in MONITAUR
2.7.1.1 Conversion
The first task was to convert MONITAUR code from Genera LISP on a
MacIvory to GCLISP on a PC. All formatting was lost in porting from
Macintosh to a PC since carriage returns are not recognized. Several software
tools were created to pretty print each LISP function and the data structure
found in LITTLE_ENGINE.
In addition to formatting problems there were several syntax incompatibilities
as well. LOOP structures and SEND functions were unsupported in GCLISP,
so recoding was required. Some changes were also made to eliminate
warning messages in the LISP interpreter. Chief among these were function
names beginning with semicolon.
To enhance our understanding of MONITAUR processing, high level data
flow diagrams for Faultfinder were constructed along with control flow charts
for MONITAUR to capture the relationships between functions.
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We also experienced some difficulty with GCLISP Developer Version 3.1 as a
development environment. Incompatibilities between GCLISP version 3.1 and
DOS 4.01 were difficult to identify. This problem occurred when Gold Hill was
reorganizing as a corporation, thus technical support was a commodity
_ difficult to find for a time. A be'ta copy of the enhanced MONITAUR was given
to NASA during their Boeing review in September 1990. This software runs
using GCLISP Developer version 3.1 under DOS 3.31.
2.7.1.2 Using Real Fault Data
After conversion, real fault data was obtained for a hung start and several
degrees of engine icing. This data was supplied from a FORTRAN/APOLLO
environment and had to be conditioned to conform to input currently used with
MONITAUR. Utility programs were created to perform the data conditioning.
These utilities allow the user to specify a selected time interval which contains
the specific features which will generate symptoms. In addition, the size of
the time slice can be set by the user within the limits of the granularity of the
data supplied. Since each fault supplied by Boeing propulsion may come from
a different flight source, all will have unique formats, so the conditioning
utilities must be adapted for each fault.
After conditioning was completed several trial runs were made with
MONITAUR using the internal NASA engine model and Boeing fault data. A
Boeing propulsion expert had identified specific symptoms for the faults
supplied. A poor match was found with symptoms generated by these first
experimental runs. MONITAUR generated extraneous symptoms and missed
critical symptoms. No attempt was made to alter the internal NASA engine
model. Instead modification of MONITAUR to accept a Boeing engine model
data was initiated. The modified MONITAUR system includes a new function
which reads fault data from a file collected from sensors during flight
(DATAFIL.DAT). This file is parsed to yield an actual value.
2.7.1.3 Using a Boeing Engine Model
The original plan was to network a Boeing (APOLLO based) engine model with
the PC version of MONITAUR to accept engine model data on a time slice
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basis. When it was discovered that this strategy violated Boeing propulsion's
engine model distribution policy, an alternate plan was devised which used
data generated by propulsion in a batch mode matching the fault data file.
New LISP functions to parse the engine model data file were created and
substituted for calls to the intei:nal engine model. The modified MONITAUR
system consists of a program which reads this model data from a file
(MODEL.FIL) which yields an expectation value. Experimental runs were
made using Boeing fault data and Boeing engine model data. The results were
improved, but not perfect when compared with symptoms identified by experts.
2.7.1.4 Additional Modifications
Modifications to the MONITAUR code were made to reduce differences
between expected symptoms and generated symptoms. An algorithm change
in trend calculation yielded more consistent trend symptoms.
An additional concern about noise levels for each sensor for each parameter
(actual value, deviation, and trend) was identified. The design of MONITAUR
is excellent in that it allows individual noise levels to be set for each sensor for
each parameter. A task was defined to utilize healthy engine data to compare
with a Boeing engine model to yield initial noise levels. The issue was to be
able to set values high enough to eliminate spurious symptoms yet low enough
to not miss significant symptoms. The comparison of engine model data with
data collected from healthy engines yielded values for noise. These were coded
into the Physical System File (PSF) for the engine model selected. A
comparison of healthy engine data with expectation data produced about 30%
fewer spurious symptoms when the custom PSF was used.
A third area of concern was the MONITAUR knowledge base which is used to
filter symptoms generated solely due to engine model behavior, and are not
real performance symptoms. The original plan was to not address
modifications in the MONITAUR knowledge base, but our work with
diagnostics has shown the tremendous importance of being able to generate
symptoms with very high reliability. The bottom line is that without extremely
accurate symptoms, the diagnostic phase development is worth very little.
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This reasoning prompted the Boeing developers to elevate the priority of
spurious symptom analysis to a much higher status. A second engine (from a
different manufacturer) was examined to insure the problem was generic. A
second PSF was customized for the new engine and heathy data was analyzed.
Consistent spurious symptoms'_cere detected for both engines. Analysis of
both engine's spurious symptoms was completed. Several sources of spurious
symptoms were identified. These were documented and forwarded to NASA in
November 1990.
For each source of spurious symptom documented, an analysis of potential
solutions was also provided. From December 1990 to present the major
developmental effort for MONITAUR has been to investigate a subset of the
alternatives suggested to determine effectiveness of the selected alternative.
Several new LISP functions were written and tested to support new symptom
filtering rules for the PSF. A significant reduction in spurious symptoms has
been achieved, but we have not addressed each alternative, nor even each
source. A large part of our follow-on recommendation will be to find an
optimal solution to spurious symptoms generation. The work accomplished to-
date can be considered proof-of-concept for spurious symptom reduction.
2.7.1.5 Output from MONITAUR
There are three levels of output from MONITAUR. The first, and most
voluminous, is the "encyclopedia run" for each fault and healthy engine file.
This file shows the state of each sensor for each time slice along with every
symptom generated. It also contains the numbers of filtering rules fired as the
symptom was analyzed.
A sample set of"encyclopedia" output is shown in Figure 6. It shows a time
slice identified by its time value, in this case "237". Prior to evaluating the
actual and expectation data, five filtering rules from the MONITAUR
knowledge base fired, #7, #9, #10, #11, and #12. These rules resulted in five
potential symptoms not being passed to DRAPhyS STAGE2. The state of each
sensor is then printed, first the actual, then the expectation states. Following
the states of the actual and expectation data, the symptoms discovered by
MONITAUR are printed. In the case of N1, the difference between the actual
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static (NORMAL) and the expectation static (LOWER, CAUTION) yield a static
symptom of HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED. Each sensor can potentially have
three symptoms (Static symptom, Derivative symptom, and Trend Symptom)
generated. When all three actual states agree with all three expectation states,
no symptoms are generated, as' 'shown in the ALTITUDE sensor. We will use
this same time slice in the discussion of output files in the following
paragraphs.
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" rule 7 fired"
" rule 9 fired"
" rule 10 fired"
" rule 11 fired"
..... rule 12 fired"
For Time 237.0:
SENSOR: N1
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCRF_JLSING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (LOWER-CAUTION)
Derivah've Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect differences between
the actual data and the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)
SENSOR: N2
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCRFJiSING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect differences between
the actual data and the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)
SENSOR: EGT
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect differences between
the actual data and the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (HIGHER-THAN,EXPECTED)
SENSOR: EPR
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (STEADY)
The following symptoms reflect differences between
the actual data and the expected values.
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING-ABNORMALLY)
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SENSOR: FUEL-FLOW
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (_NCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect differences between
the actual data and the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)
SENSOR: ALTITUDE
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (STEADY)
Trend Symptoms: (STEADY)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (STEADY)
Trend Symptoms: (STEADY)
SENSOR: MAOH
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (STEADY)
Trend Symptoms: (STEADY)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Static Symptoms: (NORMAL)
Derivative Symptoms: (STEADY)
Trend Symptoms: (STEADY)
SENSOR: THROTTLE
The following symptoms reflect the actual data.
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
The following symptoms reflect the expected values.
Derivative Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Trend Symptoms: (INCREASING)
Figure 6. '_Encyclopedia" Output from MONITAUR
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In addition, an output file iscreated for STAGE1 of DRAPhyS and for STAGE2
of DRAPhyS. The STAGE1 output consists of all sensor states and symptoms
generated from MONITAUR.
' A sample of the STAGE1 input file is shown in Figure 7. It is a file with the
format
o (
(time (sensorl) (sensor2)...)
(time (sensor1) (sensor2)...)
)
The first time slice shown is identified with the time value "237.0". Following
the time is a list of sensor states and symptoms for each sensor in the Physical
System File. This file can be passed as a list of time slices for batch processing
by STAGE1, or as individual time slices and processed sequentially in unison
with MONITAUR.
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(237.0
(THROTTLE
((STABILITY-EQT (INCREASING))"(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING))
(STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING))))
(MACH
((STABILITY-EQT (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL)) (STABILITY-AQT (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (STEADY)) (STATUS-0F-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))
(ALTITUDE
((STABILITY-EQT (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL)) (STABILITY-AQT (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))
(FUEL-FLOW
((STATUS-OF-VALUE-DQS (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)) (STABILITY-EQT
(INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL))
(STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))
(EPR
((STABILITY-DQT (INCREASING-ABNORMALLY)) (STABILITY-EQT (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL))
(STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))
(EGT
((STATUS-OF-VALUE-DQS (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)) (STABILITY-EQT
(INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL))
(STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-O F-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))
(N2
((STATUS-OF-VALUE-DQS (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)) (STABILITY-EQT
(INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL))
(STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DER1VATIVE-AQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))
(N1
((STATUS-OF-VALUE-DQS (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)) (STABILITY-EQT
(INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-D ERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (LOWER-CAUTION)) (STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS
(NORMAL)))))
Figure 7. STAGE1 Input Sample - (continued on next page)
46
p,.
(238.0
(THROTTLE
((STABILITY-EQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (FULL)) (STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (FULL))))(MACH
((STABILITY-EQT (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-DER1VATIVE-EQD (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL)) (STABILITY-AQT (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))(ALTITUDE
((STABILITY-EQT (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL)) (STABILITY-AQT (STEADY))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))(FUEL-FLOW
((STABILITY-EQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL)) (STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))(EPR
((STABILITY-EQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DER1VATIVE-EQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL)) (STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-AQD (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))(EGT
((STATUS-OF-D ERIVATIVE-DQD (NOT-INCREASING-AS-FAST-AS-EXPECTED))
(STABILITY-EQT (INCREASING)) (STATUS-OF-DERIVATIVE-EQD (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-VALUE-EQS (NORMAL)) (STABILITY-AQT (INCREASING))
(STATUS-OF-DER1VATIVE-AQD (STEADY)) (STATUS-OF-VALUE-AQS (NORMAL))))(N2
((STATUS-OF-VALUE-DQS (HIGHER-THAN-EXPECTED)) (STABILITY-EQT
INCREASING))
Figure 7. STAGE1 Input Sample
47
The STAGE2 output consists of filtered symptoms from MONITAUR. A
sample of the STAGE2 input file is shown in Figure 8. It is a file with the
format
(
((sensorl) (sensor2) (sen_or3) ...)
)
Each of the elements of the file is a list of sensor symptoms for one time slice.
Each sensor entry is a list in a format expected by the function
ADD_SYMPTOM from STAGE2. The first time slice shown is time 200, There
are no STAGE2 symptoms for this time slice, so the entry is NIL. Examination
of time slice 233 shows it is reporting sensor symptoms for N2. Examination of
time slice 237 will show it is reporting sensor symptoms for EGT, but the other
sensor symptoms shown in the "encyclopedia" run were filtered out as
spurious symptoms.
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NIL
NIL _.
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL ,.
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
!NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
((N2 NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 233.0 (STEADY)))
((EPR NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 234.0 (STEADY)) (EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL
NIL 234.0 (STEADY)) (N1 NIL (LOWER-CAUTION) NIL NIL 234.0 (STEADY)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 235.0 (STEADY)))
NIL
((EPR NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 237.0 (INCREASING)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 238.0 (INCREASING)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 239.0 (INCREASING)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 240.0 (STEADY)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 241.0 (STEADY)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 242.0 (STEADY)))
((N2 NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 243.0 (INCREASING)))
((N2 NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 244.0 (INCREASING)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 245.0 (INCREASING)) (N2 NIL (NORMAL) NIL
NIL 245.0 (INCREASING)))
((EPR NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 246.0 (STEADY)) (EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL
NIL 246.0 (INCREASING)))
((EGT NIL (NORMAL) NIL NIL 247.0 (INCREASING)))
Figure 8. STAGE2 Input Sample
49
2.7.1.6 Lessons Learned on MONITAUR
As reflected in the previous section, the most important lesson learned is to
recognize how vital an accurate set of symptoms is to the remainder of the
system. At this point in the de#_lopment it seems like an obvious fact, but the
result is that we felt it was important to expend more than anticipated effort on
MONITAUR to insure a valid set of symptoms are identified.
It is also obvious that more effort must be expended to minimize the number of
spurious symptoms. Identification of spurious symptoms is readily achieved
by processing healthy engine data through MONITAUR and looking for
symptom output. To date seven different files of healthy engine data have been
examined representing about 900 seconds of engine run time. This represents
about 900 time slices under normal query frequency. The analysis of these
symptoms for source is more complex. About 70% of the time expended in our
spurious symptom investigation was used for analysis. Several categories of
symptoms were identified. Another 30% of effort was expended in coding and
testing a subset of potential solutions for these symptom categories. At this
point in the study, we believe the list of categories is incomplete and only a
limited success in spurious symptom elimination has been achieved. It is
estimated that four man months of total effort has been devoted to spurious
symptom investigation. The goal of spurious symptom reduction will be a
major portion of a follow-on contract. It is estimated that five to ten times as
much data will be required for closure on this topic.
What is not so apparent, is how many spurious symptoms are generated by
differences in individual (serial number) engines. Boeing propulsion
estimates these differences may approach 30% for some sensors. Elimination
of spurious symptoms with known causes will help to identify a reasonable
value for those whose source is individual engine differences.
There is a potential to greatly enhance the quality of valid symptoms.
Preliminary work on valid symptom analysis suggests that some valid
symptoms may be temporally conditioned. For example, if the expectation
value is much lower than the actual value so as to generate a static symptom,
but the derivative and trend of the expectation value is much higher than the
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actual, the expectation value may be trying to "catch up" with the actual value.
In this case it may be-better to delay a static symptom generation for a few time
slices. Exactly how to inhibit this symptom is a topic of investigation. Rules
can be written for the MONITAUR filter to inhibit symptom generation, but
another alternative is to consider differing classes of symptom - perhaps a
warning class for stable symptoms and a caution class for a "catch up"
situation as described above. The topic of symptom enhancement should
definitely be studied further.
There is also evidence that the duration of time slice taken may affect
symptoms and that heuristics might be developed to dynamically select time
slice duration for each sensor as a function of developing conditions. The cost
of redesigning the data structures required to provide unique time slices for
each sensor would have to be evaluated and compared with the value of higher
fidelity sensor behavior. :
2.7.2 Work in DRAPhyS STAGE1
2.7.2.1 Conversion
The work done on DRAPhyS STAGE1 began with conversion from Genera
LISP To GCLISP with problems similar to those discussed in 2.7.1.1.
Following conversion, the system was tested using the rule base supplied with
the NASA version. The interactive function was utilized to enter symptoms
and basic functionality of STAGE1 was verified. A decision was made not to
attempt to extend the STAGE1 knowledge base until real symptoms from
MONITAUR could be input to DRAPhyS STAGE1.
2.7.2.1.1 Analysis of STAGE 1
Before extending the knowledge base or accepting any output from
MONITAUR, a better knowledge of how STAGE 1 functioned was needed. An
analysis of what each function did and its relationship to the other functions in
STAGE1 was performed. To further clarify STAGE1, a detailed flow chart was
constructed for all of the functions that were used in STAGE1.
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Examining the results of the analysis program and the detailed flow chart
revealed that three functions, INIT-STAGE1, INTERACT and START form
the core of STAGE1. To pull these three functions together, a shell that
accommodated the three core functions and the user was written for batch file
processing (discussed below in'_ection 2.7.2,2). The shell, RUN-STAGE1, is
called by the LOAD function. RUN-STAGE1 calls INIT-STAGE1 and informs
the user that STAGE1 is initialized. It then allows the user to choose between
the interactive mode (call INTERACT) or the automatic mode (call START2).
After STAGE1 has completed its run, the shell allows the user to rerun
STAGE1, remain in LISP, return to the operating system or terminate the
session.
Next, the analysis showed that there were six functions that were neither
calIed by other functions or called other functions. These functions are used in
temporal reasoning and are listed below.
STARTS
FINISHES
BEFORE
OVERLAP
MEETS
DURING
There are two other temporal reasoning functions in STAGE1, TMPRL and
TMPRL-AUX. These two functions make use of the six temporal function
listed previously, but the function TMPRL requires that it be called by the user.
This means that temporal reasoning is not presently used in STAGE1
diagnostics unless it is called by the user. The nature of the gas turbine engine
and the way events occur during its operation triggered further examination of
the MONITAUR output data. The results of this examination indicate that
temporal reasoning could be an important part of the analysis and diagnostic
. ?
process
In using STAGE1 in the interactive mode, it was discovered that the WHY and
SHOW functions did not work. This problem was not pursued because
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building a rule base for STAGE1 had a higher priority and these functions
appear to haveno use_in an integrated system.
2.7.2.2 Integration of DRAPhyS STAGE 1 with MONITAUR
,I
:_ Two approaches for integration were evaluated. The first was to generate a file
of symptoms for multiple time slices from MONITAUR and use these as a
batch input to DRAPhyS STAGE1. This offers advantages of being able to test
changes in STAGE1 without running MONITAUR. Most of the analysis
described in this report was performed using the batch method. A second
alternative was to load both MONITAUR and DRAPhyS STAGE1 and
sequentially call STAGE1 for evaluation afar each symptom set is generated
for each time slice. Both approaches have been developed. The latter approach
was developed since it more closely represents the processing required for a
real time system and offers a greater technical challenge in terms of allocating
PC resources.
MONITAUR was modified to produce a data structure which will eventually
be passed to STAGE1 for parsing into symptoms. Initially, however, this
structure was written as an output from MONITAUR for each time slice. The
file is then read into STAGE1 for parsing and analysis. The main reason for
the interim file is to allow an audit trail for system debugging.
To accommodate running the output from MONITAUR, changes to STAGE1
were required. Specifically, the function START was modified twice. The first
modification, START1, is used for the integrated version. The second
modification, START2, is used for batch processing. START2 allows the user
to name the file to be processed. While it is analyzing each time slice the
results of the analysis are printed to the screen. The results of each session is
saved in a file named by the user.
2.7.2.2.1 Using MONITAUR Output Data In STAGE1
MONITAUR's output consists of a data structure for each time slice generated
by the Boeing engine model. Each time slice contains data for up to eight
sensors. The sensors are N1, N2, EGT, EPR, FUEL-FLOW, ALTITUDE,
53
MACH and THROTTLE. For each sensor there can be up to nine pieces of
more detailed data. They are Actual - static, derivative and trend; Expectation
- static, derivative and trend and Deviation - static, derivative and trend.
For batch processing MONITAUR output data is input to STAGE1 via a floppy
disk file. Hard copies of the files were available in the form of an encyclopedia
and a print out of the disk file. The number of time slices for each file ranged
from forty five to one hundred eighty. Given the number of time slices and the
preponderance of data for each time slice, interpretation of the data was
difficult. To solve this problem, a program was written that displays the data
in an abbreviated format. This is a matrix type form with a row for each time
slice and a column for each sensor name. Presently, only five sensors are
displayed; N1, N2, EGT, EPR and FUEL-FLOW. To further simplify the
analysis, only the three Deviations are shown for each time slice/sensor
combination. Using the abbreviated format has greatly simplified analysis of
this data and building rules for STAGE1.
2.7.2.3 Adding New Rules to DRAPhyS STAGE1
Rules for Boeing identified faults were developed as a part of the fault scenario
development activity. Four rules have been added to STAGE 1 during the
second half of the project. These rules are based on the work of knowledge
engineers working with experts using actual flight data from Boeing files.
Analysis of Svmpt0m Data
To date six files have been output from MONITAUR. They are Healthy-
EngineA, Healthy-EngineB, Ground-Hung-Start, Light-Ice, Moderate-Ice and
Heavy-Ice. Each of these files was passed through the program that produced
the abbreviated symptom report.
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Analysi_ of MONITAUR Output
Healthy-Engine
It would be expected that both _Iealthy-Engine outputs from MONITAUR
would contain little if any symptom data, but this is not so. Both reports
showed about 10% of the spaces contained symptom data. This is quite high
considering that an engine with known faults i.e. Light-Ice, had a symptom
population of about 6%. These spurious symptoms were discussed in detail in
section 2.7.1.4.
Ground-Hung-Start
Hung starts can occur both on the ground and in the air, and can result from a
number of different causes. The experts provided us with data for a ground
hung start. The hung start was caused by a fuel metering unit malfunction,
providing too little fuel to the fuel nozzles. It was found that the fuel valve
either moved to a partially open position and stuck or failed to move from the
minimum open position. This resulted in insufficient combustion to support
normal spool-up to idle.
The experts' report stated that at time t3, fuel flow began to drop below the flow
rate for normal start. In addition N2 rotor speed began to lag below normal
rate. N1 and EGT remained normal at this time. At time t4, N2 and EGT did
not reach normal values and N1 leveled at 53% of normal. EGT was
increasing at the normal rate. At t5 N2 should have been at idle speed, but was
at only 67% of idle RPM. EGT was still normal. At t6 N1 and N2 were still at
below normal speeds, and EGT continued to increase to 13% above normal,
instead of leveling off.
A rule set was constructed for ground hung start using the da_a supplied by
the experts. The rule set was tested against the output data from MONITAUR
and fired successfully when the data indicated a hung start.
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Light-Ice
+.
Any ingestion of foreign matter such as birds, volcanic ash, or ice is classified
as foreign object damage (FOD). In the ease of light-ice d_mage, F0D results
in an step-function change in thh level of vibration produced by the engine,
while all other parameters remain relatively normal. The effect of damage
and the resulting thrust shortfall may be so subtle that it would not be detected
by the crew until the throttle is advanced for take-off or go-around (TOGA)
power (advancing the throttle).
The output from MONITAUR for light-ice damage comes close to verifying
this. The only real deviation from this is the Higher-Than-Expected EGT.
This may be due to a number of factors, from the age of the engine to problems
with the model. Because vibration data is not normally collected, and the lack
of other symptom data produced by MONITAUR, no rules were constructed for
light-ice.
Moderate-Ice
The symptoms for moderate ice damage differ depending on the commanded
power setting. The two power settings observed were climb and cruise.
In the climb setting, N1 speed was on target while N2 showed a decrease of 5%.
Both EGT and Fuel-Flow fell slightly below expected value. As in low ice
damage, these shortfalls could be difficult for the crew to observe. Also, the
vibration level on N1 exceeded the expected value by 25%. A spike appeared in
N2 vibration reading, then it dropped to the expected value.
In the cruise setting, thrust shortfall increased slightly from climb setting. N2
was at the expected level. EGT and Fuel-Flow remained slightly lower than
expected. N1 vibration remained at 25% above expected value, but N2 vibration
reading was averaging 200% higher than expected value. Acceleration to the
commanded thrust level was slightly slower than expected.
The output from MONITAUR for moderate-ice damage is difficult to interpret
for three reasons. First, sensor data for any given series of time slices is not
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consistent. Second, symptoms differ between modes of operation, i.e., climb
and cruise. Third, vibration data is not available from MONITAUR, and
vibration, as with low ice damage seems to be the only clear indication of
damage in an FOD situation. The other indications (EGT, N2 speed and Fuel-
Flow) are subtle and may not be' noticed in the cockpit. In addition, these
differences could fall within the noise bands of MONITAUR deviation detection
and not appear in the symptom file. Due to these reasons, no rules were
constructed for moderate ice damage.
Heavy Ice
While changes in vibration levels on low (N1) andhigh (N2) speed rotors are
evident with light and moderate ice damage, they do not show up with heavy
damage. Instead, the vibration symptom evident for heavy damage is a
marked increase in broad band vibration. In addition, the shortfall with light
ice damage is only evident under TOGA power settings. Moderate ice damage
results in a slight shortfall at climb power. But, with heavy ice damage, the
shortfall is very evident even at cruise power (i.e., approximately 80% of
normal). N2 was lower than expected, and both EGT and Fuel-Flow were
lower than expected.
The output from MONITAUR for heavy ice damage is heavily populated with
symptom data and compares closely with the expert's statement. The only
disagreement is in EPR and Fuel-Flow. MONITAUR shows EPR lower than
expected and no Deviation for Fuel-Flow for the first eighteen time slices. It
then shows Fuel-Flow increasing until time slice 60.5. At time 61.0, it begins
to decrease till time 69.0, aider that it remains normal. The experts statement
shows lower than expected for both EPR and Fuel-Flow. The reasons for this
discrepancy are still being investigated.
Based on the expert's information a set of rules was built for Heavy Ice
damage. However, the data concerning Fuel-Flow was left out of the rule set
pending further investigation into the problem. The rule set was tested
against the MONITAUR output and was successful in firing when Heavy Ice
damage was indicated.
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2.7.2.4 Alternate DRAPhySSTAGE1 Development
An alternate to DRAPhyS STAGE1 was also examined. In an attempt to allow
STAGE1 processing on incomplete symptom information, a fault pruning
paradigm was created using NEXPERT OBJECT. A knowledge base
consisting of an object architecture and a rule base were designed to allow
incremental knowledge to be accumulated with a corresponding incremental
reasoning about the associated fault(s). The paradigm consists of an object
architecture with a set of faults modeled with associated properties. The rule
base examines the current set of symptoms and dynamically prunes potential
faults from the object architecture using negative evidence. Thus as the set of
symptoms is developed, the list of possible faults is diminished. The advantage
of this approach is the development of partial knowledge with incomplete
evidence (as opposed to conventional approach which only fires rules when
complete knowledge is available).
The status of this alternative is a current working demo with information
modeled from a NASA supplied rule base. This demo lacks fidelity, and is not
a proof of concept. It was demonstrated to NASA in September 1990 as a
potentially more robust approach to conventional STAGE1 processing. No
further development on this alternative is anticipated unless specifically
requested by NASA.
2.7.2.5 Lessons Learned on DRAPhyS STAGE1
1. More data is needed to ensure the fidelity of rules generated in STAGE1.
Multiple incidences of the same fault and an expanded range of faults
are both required. Each individual engine is different from the next. In
addition, as engines age, their operational characteristics change. And
finally, any repair or adjustment made to an engine, during routine
maintenance or unscheduled maintenance, can change its operational
characteristics. Thus, more comparisons are needed to establish the
reliability and validity of the diagnostic process.
A solution to the above problem is to collect data and create separate data
files for different engines and measure differences between engines.
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The analysis should take into consideration the fact that as the engine
accumulates operation time, its operation characteristics will change,
therefore, operating time of the engine should by collected by the system.
2. Diagnosing with symptoms from only one time slice at a time is not
effective. Engine failures and problems are progressive in nature. A
complete set of symptoms do not occur all at once. They may occur one
or two at a time, or a new symptom may take the place of the previous
symptom. Symptoms may also by intermittent and/or transient and go
away.
Building a history of sensor symptoms for each time slice and analyzing
them with temporal reasoning to see if they match a rule, would be a
more realistic type of diagnosis. Both data collection and accumulation,
and diagnosis would occur in the same time slice.
3. Data could be collected by MONITAUR and analyzed in a three
dimensional matrix. Each plane of the matrix would be a fault file in
the matrix format described in section 2.7.2.3. Each file produced by
MONITAUR could be analyzed for the number of symptoms it holds.
Symptoms may occur in clusters or groups; certain symptoms within
time slice by sensor cells of the matrix may form patterns that could be
built into rules. The data could be analyzed for symptom trends which
could be used for early detection of problems. The data for one
operational period could be compared with data from other operational
periods to establish trends in symptom occurrence. And finally, the
data used to build possible rules could be compared with the data that
was used to build existing rules. This would prevent building identical
rules for different failures.
If a failure occurs during operation, and the collected data did not
match a rule, it may be possible that the data could be analyzed to
determine an alternate or additional symptom for the failure. This may
be another way to use collected data to build rules.
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4. Include altitude, Mach and throttle sense data in the data analyzed by
STAGE1. Analysis of present symptom data shows that symptoms
change during different phases of flight and engine operation. The
symptoms for FOD in climb are different from the FOD symptoms in
cruise. In fact, the total' _ngine operational characteristics could
change during different phases of flight and engine operation.
These different phases of flight and engine operation could be detected by
monitoring actual altitude, Mach and throttle settings. This data would
also be included in the rules.
There are some factors, not previously considered within the scope• of this
study, which may have a significant bearing on the Boeing perspective. One of
these is the response required for the fault. If there are a limited number of
valid responses to all engine faults, perhaps diagnosis does not have to be
accomplished to the granularity previously defined. It may be that STAGE1
only needs to associate symptoms with classes of faults in order to generate the
correct response to the problem. These issues will not be addressed in the
current contract, but should be noted for further study. They also suggest that
STAGE1 (associational) processing may not be as dependent on fault specificity
as originally thought.
2.7.3 Work in DRAPhyS STAGE2
Work completed on DRAPhyS STAGE2 began with a Boeing analysis of the
model based paradigm utilized in this NASA, developed module. As an initial
effort to gain understanding of the software, high level data flow diagrams and
control flow charts have been constructed to document the system
functionality. The demonstration system supplied by NASA was installed and
made functional on Boeing hardware. This demonstration program is a
stand-alone interactive system with symptoms input through mouse selection
from a GUI or by using text based LISP functions. Boeing's first objective was
to create a connection from the output from MONITAUR, which is a list of
symptoms, to the DRAPhyS STAGE2 program.
2.7.3.1 Development Strategy for DRAPhyS STAGE2
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Since DRAPhyS STAGE2 contains extensive use of Flavors, which is not
supported in GCLISP, conversion to GCLISP was not an option. To make
STAGE2 compatible with the PC versions of MONITAUR and DRAPhyS
STAGE1, two alternatives were'considered. The first was to develop a stand
alone version of STAGE2 on the MacIvory under Genera LISP which is CLOE
compatible. When the desired functionality could be demonstrated on the
MacIvory, the code would be ported to a PC using CLOE. A run time version
would then be completely PC based. A second alternative (not implemented)
was to leave the development on the MacIvory workstation and network the PC
with MONITAUR output to the MacIvory for STAGE2 processing.
2.7.3.2 STAGE2 Development
DRAPhyS STAGE2 was redeveloped to a PC-connectable module capable of
accepting symptom input from MONITAUR using CLOE. Minor
modifications were made to DRAPhyS STAGE2 for the CLOE version. Most
were syntax incompatibilities between CLOE LISP and Genera LISP. Just as
the development of PC versions of MONITAUR and DRAPhyS STAGE1 with
_ real fault and Boeing engine model input led to discovery of issues of concern
and strategies for further development, STAGE2 yielded similar concerns and
strategies. The CLOE version of STAGE2 was modified to accept input from
the MONITAUR program. The data can be passed to STAGE2 in a time slice
format or in a batch mode consisting of multiple time slices.
A major concern was the effect of spurious symptoms in the DRAPhyS
STAGE2 system. Current STAGE2 processing allows no symptom evaluation.
Each symptom is processed as valid and appropriate fault hypotheses are
generated and tested. For this reason, extensive symptom evaluation must be
complete d in MONITAUR. Most of the rules added to the current version of
MONITAUR have the function of filtering spurious symptoms from STAGE2
input. As was discussed in section 2.7.1.4, this task remains incomplete and
would be a major effort in a follow-on project.
Once the problem of spurious symptoms is solved, the next question to consider
is enhancement of STAGE2 analysis. The current model based reasoning
61
paradigm utilizes only functional and physical connectivity for fault analysis
and hypothesis gener_ation and testing. The symptom input mechanism
currently defined in ADD_SYMPTOM contains sensor behavior information,
but knowledge of this information is not exploited within DRAPhyS STAGE2.
An enhancement strategy would be to expand the current paradigm to include
exploitation of behavioral information to increase the fidelity of the valid
hypotheses produced.
One method would be to add behavior to the appropriate data structure for each
component modeled in each subsystem. Instead of propagating the binary
condition "abnormal sensor" through the model, agreement between actual
sensor behavior and modeled behavior would be required for fault propagation.
We could still retain the binary condition as a default if other search strategies
fail. A second method would be to incorporate rules from DRAPhyS STAGE 1
directly into STAGE2. One architecture would have sensor behavior feeding
inputs into component objects, and part of the component's behavior would
derive an output of the condition of that component. An alternative
architecture would have the component control an output for related sensor
behavior such that if the component is in a specific state, it would assign
values to the associated sensors. If we were to adopt this strategy, STAGE1
would become a testing vehicle for adding new rules. Yet a third method
would be to model the fault mechanism (i.e., various known ways a device can
break along with the safety net of "UNKNOWN", which we have now, where
known modes carry alternate behaviors that can be tested against later data).
These approaches should be subjected to an alternatives analysis in a follow-on
project.
Finally, the anticipated use of context variables for enhanced fault
identification and for response clarification may also impact STAGE2
development. Use might be made of context variables to prune the multiple
fault hypotheses currently generated in STAGE2. This question should be
addressed in a follow-on project.
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2.7.3.3 Lessons learned on DRAPhyS STAGE2.
The most important lesson learned from processing real data in DRAPhyS
STAGE2 is the unacceptability of spurious symptoms. When healthy engine
data was processed by MONITAUR and spurious symptoms were passed to
STAGE2, a host of hypotheses were generated with several being validated as
faulty sensors. What remains to be investigated is whether sufficient symptom
conditioning can be performed to render STAGE2 processing usable. At
present, the current system does not represent a feasible approach to
processing real engine data.
2.7.4 priQri_zed Suggestions for Further Study
In view of the progress on all three modules outlined above, the following is the
recommended development strategy for the follow-on Flight Deck Engine
Advisor Project.
Priority 1.
A maximum effort should be made to eliminate as many spurious symptoms
as possible from MONITAUR. Only when spurious symptoms have been
absolutely minimized can we evaluate individual engine differences to
determine feasibility of real symptom identification. A few of the alternatives
suggested in the spurious symptom analysis previously sent to NASA have
been explored with encouraging results, but this list needs to be exhausted.
Real symptom enhancement needs to be explored, both within MONITAUR
and in the follow-on diagnosis. The example of actual versus expected "catch-
up" cited in section 2.7.1.6 is only one of several potential enhancement
strategies which may be promoted. Addition of temporal reasoning and ability
to reason over multiple time slices to either MONITAUR or STAGE1 (more
'_ efficiently done in STAGE1) falls in this category. This will require the
propagation of historical queue data from MONITAUR to STAGE1 or the
° reconstruction of this data within STAGE1.
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More fault data must be collected to ensure the fidelity of rules generated in
STAGE1. Multiple incidences of the same fault and an expanded range of
faults are both required. To fully evaluate the symptom generation from
MONITAUR, STAGE1 development must be maintained in the next iteration.
Only with a STAGE1 in place cdn the identity of unique combinations of
conditions (and related symptoms)be determined.
Priority 2.
The effect of individual engine differences needs to be investigated. This
should be a follow-on activity to elimination of spurious symptoms, but a
parallel effort could be undertaken to identify alternatives for dealing with
individual differences.
Addition of behavior (in some form) to STAGE2 needs to be addressed as well.
This could be a follow-on activity to spurious symptom identification, but could
also be a parallel effort. In either case it would be better to utilize real fault
data for this task.
3.0 COMMUNICATIONS
3.1 Contacts with NASA-Langley Personnel
3.1.1 Meetings
Coordination meetings to identify specific content for the Detailed Program
Plan were held at NASA-Langley, Hampton VA - 4710/90 to 4713/90.
Participants: NASA-Langley - K.H. Abbott, P.C. Schutte; Boeing - W.D.
Shontz, R.M. Records.
Project definition presentation and discussions for ATOPS- TRCO held at
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Renton facility - 8/7/90. Participants:
NASA-Langley - Cary Spitzer; Boeing - Ralph Erwin, Bill Shontz, Mary
Hornsby.
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Presentation on project progress and discussion of potential follow-on topics
held at Boeing, Renton facility - 9/26/90 and 9/27/90. Participants: NASA-
Langley - K.H. Abbott, P.C. Schutte; Boeing - W.D. Shontz, R.M. Records, J.G.
Lutch.
Presentation of Oral Interim Report followed by discussions with NASA, BB &
N, and Boeing personnel held at NASA-Langley, Hampton, VA - 11/27/90 and
11/28/90. Participants: NASA-Langley - K.H. Abbott, P.C. Schutte; BB & N -
W.H. Rogers; Boeing - W.D. Shontz, G.P. Boucek.
Coordination meetings to discuss issues affecting follow on to the current
project and to clarify details of follow on activity which would be acceptable to
NASA were held at NASA-Langley, Hampton, VA - 2/28/91 and 3/1/91.
Participants: NASA-Langley - I_H. Abbott, P.C. Schutte; Boeing - W.D.
Shontz. Also coordinated Flight Deck Engine Advisor activities on pilot
information requirements with W.H. Rogers of BB & N.
Attended meeting and made presentation on the Flight Deck Engine Advisor
project at the GE installation at Evensdale, OH - 3/20/91. Participants: NASA-
Langley - K.H. Abbott; Boeing - W.D. Shontz; GE - Dave Doel, et al
3.1.2 .Telephone Consultations
Clarification of specific project activities as described in the Detailed Program
Plan - 5/6/90 and 5/9/90. Participants: NASA-Langley - Paul Schutte; Boeing -
Roger Records, Bill Shontz.
Discussion of revision to the Detailed Program Plan suggested by Kathy Abbott
- 6/1/90. Participants: NASA-Langley - Kathy Abbott; Boeing - Bill Shontz.
Further discussion of proprietary issues and current status with respect to
being able to deliver an engine model and real engine data- 6/18/90.
Participants: NASA-Langley - Kathy Abbott; Boeing - Bill Shontz.
Phone consultations with BB & N subcontractor to NASA,Langley to coordinate
BB & N and Boeing efforts on pilot information requirements as they relate to
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work both companies are doing for NASA-Langley on the Faultfinder concept.
Several phone Galls over thecourse of the project. Participants: BB & N - W.H.
Rogers; Boeing - W.D. Shontz.
Phone consultations on project, progress, direction, and trip planning.
Numerous phone calls over the course of the project on technical issues, status
and content of follow on SOW, status of resolution of proprietary data issues,
coordination of trips and meetings. Participants: NASA-Langley - Kathy o
Abbott, Paul Schutte; Boeing - Bill Shontz, Roger Records.
3.2 Contacts with Engine Manufacturers
3.2.1 Pratt & Whitney
Person Contacted: Bill Stepule (203)565-9371
Contacted by: Bill Shontz
Data of Contact: 8/9/90
Summary of Information Obtained:
Mr. Stepule is in a diagnostics group where they evaluate flight data, program
ACMS, and have developed ground based software for monitoring engine
performance at the module level. The PW engine condition monitoring
program is called Turbine Engine Aids Monitoring (TEAM 3).
We discussed at some length the kind of monitoring and control activity that
occurs in the engine controller on new engines. We also discussed PW's
engine condition monitoring program with the airlines. I will have more
comments on these areas in a general summary at the end of this section. In
general, Stepule indicated PW was interested in the type of engine monitoring
represented by the Engine Advisor project but that they lacked the time to
investigate it more thoroughly at present.
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3.2.2 Rolls Royce
Person contacted: Mike Barwell (011)44-332,-249505
Contacted by: Bill Shontz
Date of Contact: 8/23/90
. Summary of Information Obtained:
Each of the engine manufacturers contacted has a sol, ware program for
monitoring engine condition. The Rolls Royce system is call COMPASS -
Condition Monitoring and Performance Analysis Sol, ware System. COMPASS
is said to have an engine model embedded in it. However, the nature of this
model is not entirely clear from the written material Mr. Barwell referred me
to (Ref 7) and he did not elaborate beyond the information contained in the
paper. The frame of reference I gave in introducing myself was our interest in
airborne engine model/monitoring systems to provide diagnostic and trend
information on engine performance on the flight deck. Mike indicated that RR
was not doing anything at the moment that would convert COMPASS to an
airborne system. However, the COMPASS features of deviation detection and
trend analysis are certainly capabilities which an airborne system should
have.
3.2.3 General Electric
Persons Contacted: Neal Walker - 8/23/90 - (513)774-6083
Jim Elliot - 9/11/90 - (513)774-6143
Kiyoung Chung - 9/11/90 - (513)583-5401
Dave Doel - 9/11/90 - (513)583-5469
Hal Brown- 9/13/90 - (513)583-5441
George Converse - 9/17/90 - (513)583-5466
Ron Plybon - 10/4/90 - (513)583-5472
Contacted by: Bill Shontz
Dates of Contact: Between 8/23/90 and 10/4/90
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Summary of Information Obtained:
My contacts with Walker, Elliott, and Chung served to identify additional
people within GE with whom I should talk. In fact, each person in the list
above referred me to the next p_rson as one I should really talk with. The
conversations with Doel, Brown, Converse, and Plybon were all of a technical
nature and with increasing level of specific technical details. Of these ,J
contacts, Dave Doel will probably be the primary focal point for further contacts
with GE for two reasons. One, he is familiar with the Faultfinder concepts via
having read paper presentations of Abbott, et al at NASA-Langley and will be
the GE focal point for contact with NASA-Langley. Two, Ron Plybon referred
me back to Dave at the end of our conversation on 10/4/90.
As with the other two engine manufacturers, GE is focusing primarily on
ground based engine condition monitoring for maintenance (they call their
system GEM). However, there appears to be a great deal of activity in engine
monitoring and control which would be relevant to the development of a flight
deck engine advisor system. Further, one of Dave Doel's charges appears to be
to keep up with developments of flight deck engine advisor concepts. Hal
Brown indicated GE has done some work towards fault detection on civilian
engines; they have done much more on military contracts - particularly the
Pilot's Associate program. He also indicated they will be doing more in the
future.
Of particular interest was the concept of "hard and soft failures" discussed by
both Brown and Plybon. Hard failures are those that occur over a relatively
short time span and are relatively easy to detect and diagnose. Soi_ failures, on
the other hand, are the result of slow degradation in part or component
performance and are very difficult to detect and diagnose. It is in detecting
and diagnosing these latter types of failures that the Faultfinder concept could
have a major impact.
3.2.4 General Summary of First H_lf Contacts %
All engine manufacturers surveyed have developed major software packages
for engine condition monitoring to support mair_tenance planning activities.
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However, interest in the Faultfinder concept of monitoring and diagnosis
varied considerably. It is not known whether this represents genuine
differences in levels of interest within companies or different levels of concern
for proprietary issues among individuals I talked with.
It also became clear, that there is considerable monitoring going on in new
electronic engine controllers that is of the type that would be directly applicable
to the Engine Advisor concepts. Further, the continual addition of parameters
that are sensed suggests the possibility of much more sophisticated trend
monitoring and fault prediction than has been possible in the past. The weak
links to date in developing engine monitoring and fault diagnosis systems
which provide information to the flight deck is the availability of sophisticated
and reliable real-time engine models. These models must have stable,
narrowly defined bands for normal parameter performance yet be adaptable to
the variations across engines of the same type. A second weakness is the lack
of a well organized, structured data base readily available for engine model
and monitoring and diagnosis module development. The engine performance
data base being accrued by the major airlines along with Boeing flight test data
and engine manufacturer data may serve as a starting point for data base
development.
A second round of contacts with Key individuals at each company will be
initiated during the second half of the contract.
3.3 Second Half Contacts with Engine Manufacturers
3.3.1 Pratt & Whitney
Persons Contacted: Rick LaPrad - 1/29/91 - (203)565-6883
Bill Stepule - 2/11/91
Dick Meisner - 4/11/91 - (203)565-3842
Bill Gallops- 5/13/91 - (407)796-2172
Contacted by: Bill Shontz
Dates of Contact: Between 1/29/91 and 5/1_3/91
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Summary of Information Obtained:
The contact with Rick LaPrad served only as reference back to Bill Stepule who
was contacted early in the currdnt project. The discussion with Stepule
focused on his work in performance monitoring. It appears, based on
discussions of performance monitoring work with the engine manufacturers,
that the airlines may be the best source of fault data acquired in an operational
environment. Stepule also referred me to Dick Meisner at Hartford. Meisner
in turn referred me to Bill Gallops of PW's newly renamed Government
Engines and Space Propulsion Division (formerly the GovernmentProducts
Division) in West Palm Beach. It was with the Gallops contact that I was at
last talking with the right person at Pratt & Whitney. As with GE, PW's work
on engine modelling has been largely supported by military programs. Both
PW and GE have approaches to adaptive engine modelling which are similar
in some ways but quite different in others. It remains to be seen which
approach would best support the monitoring function within the Flight Deck
Engine Advisor system. The proprietary issues surrounding transfer of
engine model code and engine data was raised with Gallops. He indicated he
would try to contact people in the commercial _oup at Hartford regarding the
issue. He also suggested that perhaps an industry group such as an SAE
committee should be formed to coordinate efforts in engine modelling so that
people retain an appropriate focus.
Contact will be maintained with PW through Bill Gallops. He knows Dave
Doel of GE and they appear to be comparable contacts at the two engine
manufacturers.
3.3.2 Rolls Royc_
Person Contacted: Dennis Bumell - (011) 44-332-247922
Contacted by: Bill Shontz
Date Contacted: 1/29/91
7O
Summary of Information Obtained:
Dennis Burnell is in the Advanced Controls group of RR Bristol. He was an
appropriate person to be talking with but as in the earlier conversation with
Mike Burwell very little information was gained about what RR may be doing
that is related to the current contract. No further contact is planned with Rolls
Royce.
3.3.3 General Electric
Persons Contacted: Dave Doel, et al
Contacted by: Bill Shontz
Date(s) Contacted: Doel phone calls re meeting at Evensdale 3/20/91 -
meeting at Evensdale, OH
Summary of Information Obtained:
The meeting at GE in Evensdale, OH consisted of a number of presentations by
GE people describing work they have undertaken which they felt relevant to the
fault management program efforts being sponsored by NASA-Langley.
Speakers included:
Dave Doel - GEAE
Kathy Abbott - NASA-Langley
Bill Shontz - Boeing
Hal Brown - GEAE
Dick Dyson - GEAE (phone number not available)
Bruce Pomeroy - GE CR & D (phone number not available)
Pete McDonald - GEAE (phone number not available)
Presentations were followed by a discussion of issues of common interest to the
group. Included in this discussion was the potential for NASA obtaining an
engine model from GE. There was no one present who could really address
the issue.
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3.3.4 General Summary of 2nd Half Contacts
It appears that both GE and PW have some activity under way directed at
developing the kind(s) of engine model(s) needed to support a flight deck engine
advisor system. The approache_ appear to be similar in some ways and very
different in others. The information available at this time is insufficient to
permit any judgement on the feasibility of the approaches. Such a judgement
should be made, however, before tying the development of the Flight Deck
Engine Advisor system to a particular approach.
4.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
4.1 Hardware and Software Selection
The selection of a PC environment using GCLISP and CLOE for enhancement
of Faultfinder has provided additional flexibility for the research process. We
were able to modify MONITAUR to accept real fault data in a batch mode and
integrate the associated engine model data files. The GCLISP environment,
while not as elegant as Genera LISP, still proved adequate to accommodate the
revisions implemented to reduce spurious symptom generation in
MONITAUR and fault-symptom association in STAGE1 of DRAPhyS. The
CLOE implementation was, in like manner, adequate for testing the through
put of real fault data in STAGE2 of DRAPhyS.
We recommend the continued use of both PC development environments for a
follow on project. Should NASA choose to disseminate our enhanced versions
of MONITAUR, STAGE1 and STAGE2, they will find the engineering
community at large has a much larger PC base than LISP workstations.
4.2 Fault Scenario Selection and Development
4.2.1 Selection
The selection process involved selection of an engine model to be used in the
enhancement process and candidate faults to be ased in the information
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requirements analysis and knowledge base development. Engine model
selection was quite straight forward once available models were identified.
Propulsion simulation experts familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of
the various models evaluated each model on the basis of criteria developed by
Boeing and NASA. The model selected had clear advantages over competing
models. The details of this process are described in Section 2.4.1. Proprietary
issues have precluded inclusion of the modelled engine's identity and code in
the Final Report. Efforts to permit inclusion of an engine model and engine
data as a part of the deliverables in any future work on Flight Deck Engine
Advisor are being carried out as a part of the follow on proposal process.
Fault candidate selection was driven by two factors; availability of real engine
data, and the match between fault data characteristics and the criteria for
selection developed by NASA and Boeing. Of these two, availability was the key
factor. Eventually we were able to acquire data on eight faults which, taken
together, provided coverage of all nine criteria established. The process of
selecting faults continued over a much longer period during the contract than
had originally been planned because of the nature of the process of identifying
potential faults and locating and preparing the engine data for analysis. The
identity of faults and location of the data resided in the memory of engineers
who had worked with the data rather than being available through a readily
accessible cataloging system. Rather than arbitrarily terminate the search for
additional fault data early in the contract, we elected to leave the possibility of
acquiring additional data open as long as possible. This did not delay work on
knowledge base development and allowed us to devote more time to the details
of fault scenario development than would have otherwise been possible. The
result was an iterative approach to fault scenario and knowledge base
development which allowed us to complete more fault scenarios than would
have been possible under the original schedule.
4.2.2 Development
Fault scenarios were developed to serve as the data base for knowledge base
development. They are the repository of data on the fault propagation sequence
and symptoms. Because the pilot information requirements were in fact an
integral part of data needed for knowledge base development, information
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requirements analysis was carried out as a part of scenario development. The
information requirements analysis and related conceptual development are
discussed separately below. A complete version of each fault scenario is
contained in Appendix A. The overall concepts developed and definitions of the
various entries in the scenarios 'are contained in Section 2.5.
The process of developing data on fault propagation, symptoms, and
information requirements for fault diagnosis represented the knowledge
engineering phase of knowledge base development. The experts involved in
this process were propulsion simulation experts and research pilots. Fault
candidates were identified and engine data acquired by the propulsion experts.
Preliminary guidance on fault propagation sequence and symptoms was also
provided. From this, the fault scenario contents were developed. Propulsion
experts and pilots then reviewed the contents for accuracy, clarity, and
completeness. Additional potential fault alternatives were typically identified
at this stage. When a fault scenario had completed this process it was turned
over to the knowledge base developers. Any modifications to the scenario data
base required to enhance its use in knowledge base development were also
made. The result is a well coordinated and integrated data base for knowledge
base development and a starting point for future analyses of pilot information
requirements.
While the fault data base used in the present study was adequate to support
initial enhancement activities on the MONITAUR and DRAPhyS modules,
additional data will be required for further development of the DRAPhyS
modules and feasibility testing of MONITAUR. Some additional fault data will
be available from flight test files but efforts to identify and expand the data base
through engine manufacturers and airlines are proposed as a part of follow on
work.
4.3 Pilot Information Requirements
The information requirements analysis conducted as a part of fault scenario
development focused on information required to diagnose faults without
concern for whether the diagnostic process was carried put by humans or
computers. This approach was necessary to provide the data needed for
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knowledge base development. It may be contrasted with higher level analyses
of pilot information requirements in fault management being supported by
NASA through other contractors. As a part of the analysis conducted on the
current project, information now available to pilots was identified as well as
the information required for di_ignosis. The criticality of any discrepancies
defined is a function of the level of diagnosis the pilot must go to in order to
select the optimal action alternative. This in turn will be affected by the level of
automation present in the system(s) in which the fault propagates and the
ability of the automation to control fault management. An issue which needs a
good deal of further investigation is impact of state-of-the-art automation in
airplane systems on fault management problems. This issue would be
addressed in a Context Analysis task proposed for follow on work.
An important aspect of the information requirements work on the present_
contract was the development of a conceptual framework for addressing the
event/fault/context/action relationships involved in fault management. The
relationships are complex but analysis could also indicate ways to simplify the
problems in fault management while allowing pilots to deal with faults more
selectively than they now can. Allowing pilots to deal with more complexity
while simplifying the decision process would, of course, require the support of
a Flight Deck Engine Advisor system. Details of the conceptual framework are
to be found in Section 2.5.3. The feasibility and efficacy of the concepts would be
tested in the Context Analysis proposed for follow on work.
A number of issues related to information requirements are discussed within
the context of specific fault scenarios. This is as it should be because the issues
are context specific. However, the issues which generalize are: ....
- granularity of the data (which includes sensor resolution); and
- reliability and validity of parameter data for fault diagnosis and action
recommendations.
Generally speaking, the engine parameter data available from flight tests is
based on sensors which have much greater resolution (i.e., are much more
sensitive) than sensors available on operational 6ngines. Further, more
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sensors are installed for fliKht testing; hence more parameters are measured.
These sensors also happen to be too fragile for the operational environment.
Probes would break off and create their own faults. Thus it is possible, with
the test flight data, to see the potential for detecting the adverse trends of fault
propagation much earlier and ivith more precision than may be possible with
data from operational sensors. The issue is not simply the presence or absence
of sensors. In some cases, the parameters are sensed and the information
used by the electronic engine controller but is not currently available to
systems which communicate with the flight deck. In other cases, the
availability of sensors is an option to the airline purchasing the engine.
Therefore,:: it is appropriate to base our analyses on what may be available
operationally as well as what is.
The reliability and validity issue relates to the fact that our current data base
does not contain enough samples of same event caused by same fault or same
event caused by different fault. These additional fault data samples are needed
to test the effectiveness of the Flight Deck Engine Advisor modules in detecting
and diagnosing faults across engines and event/fault combinations. These
issues would be addressed as a part of the Engine Data Survey task proposed as
a part of a follow on effort.
4.4 Knowledge Base Development
As real engine data for known faults were processed through MONITAUR for
symptom identification, the problem of spurious symptoms became apparent.
When healthy engine data was passed through the system, the extent of
spurious symptom generation was found to be present in excess of 50% of the
time slices. Analysis revealed several potential causes and initial efforts to
reduce spurious symptoms have been quite successful.. The current level for
healthy engine data stands at between 20-30% of the time slices, a value still too
high for operational integrity. We have identified several additional strategies
for further reducing spurious symptoms which should be pursued in a follow
on project.
As a result of our work on symptom generation, NASA °agreed to a reduction
in effort on knowledge base development. We have done significant
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development in associational fault identification in STAGE1 of DRAPhyS. Our
investigation with real fault data has produced a strategy for knowledge
acquisition that includes traditional expert interviews coupled with a data
verifying technique using a matrix format for symptom analysis. As this
process is refined, it can probably be automated, More fault data is needed for
a follow on project - especially multiple occurrences of the same fault, as well
as a broader spectrum of faults.
Our work with STAGE2, the model based reasoning component of DRAPhyS,
has been primarily familiarization and conversion to a PC environment. We
have analyzed the current model based implementation and have made
recommendations for potential enhancement by identifying several
alternatives for incorporating sensor behavior into the system. We are
confident that any of the alternatives will improve the fidelity of the hypotheses
generated by the model based system. One of the alternatives would allow a
merger of STAGE1 and STAGE2 forming a hybrid capable of both robust
behavior and fault association.
5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on lessons learned in conducting the current project, the following
recommendations are made as reasonable and appropriate next steps in follow
on work for the Flight Deck Engine Advisor program.
5.1 Stand Alone MON1TAUR
There are three areas of improvement which should be developed for a
demonstration of MONITAUR feasibility. First, spurious symptoms must be
eliminated, or at least minimized to an acceptable level. Next, steps must be
taken to insure that valid symptoms are retained in the process of eliminating
spurious symptoms. Finally, valid symptoms must be enhanced to promote
successful diagnosis. _,
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5.1.1 Spurious Symptom Elimination
A primary goal of a follow on project must be to minimize the number of
spurious symptoms generated from MONITAUR. During the present
investigation we have identifiecI multiple sources of spurious symptoms and
have significantly reduced the initial volume. Additional alternatives have
also been identified and must be developed. We anticipate that other sources of
small numbers of spurious symptoms can yet be determined. This should be a
priority in the next project.
To insure a true minimum of spurious symptoms, more fault data must be
collected. To verify the generality of current symptom-fault association,
multiple instances of the same fault should be used. To verify that a broad
spectrum of spurious symptoms have been filtered, more individual faults
need to be analyzed.
5.1.2 Valid Symptom Retention
A possible consequence of spurious symptom filtering is the loss of valid
symptoms. Great care must be taken to avoid the loss of valid symptoms while
eliminating spurious symptoms. A method of evaluating the quality of valid
symptoms is needed. Validating the existence of all anticipated symptoms for
known faults is one approach to safeguarding valid symptom generation. We
recommend a minimal STAGE1 development as a MONITAUR evaluation
tool. The secondary effect of constructing a STAGE1 knowledge base with
enhanced fault identification will be of mutual benefit to both NASA and
Boeing.
5.1.3 Valid Symptom Enhancement
The last category of work for MONITAUR is valid symptom enhancement.
Boeing has identified two strategies for enhancing the fidelity of valid
symptoms generated by MONITAUR - Use of _ontext variables and use of
symptom type.
78
The effect of context variables is discussed in section 5.3, but provision for
incorporating knowledge about context variables needs to be made in
MONITAUR. Symptom enhancement may take the form of symptom
elimination, symptom addition, or symptom modification. An example is the
phase of flight. During our current study, a pattern of symptoms for ground
hung start was found similar to a pattern for heavy ice damage. A simple
addition of phase of flight would have enhanced this symptom pattern enough
to be unique.
The analysis of symptom development with real fault data has shown that not
all symptoms have the same severity. The case of sensor "catch up i' described
in section 2.7.1.6, when the actual value of a sensor was approaching, but not
quite close enough to, the expected value, is a good example. Categorization of
symptom severity offers potential for valid symptom enhancement and should
be developed in the follow on project.
5.2 Engine Fault Data Base Survey
The current data base on engine faults is inadequate to support feasibility
testing of the expert system based modules for fault detection and diagnosis.
The nature and extent of a relevant data base made up of real in-flight engine
fault data is unknown at this time. Indications are that the necessary data
base will need to be assembled from a number of sources - primarily airlines
and engine manufacturers. It is recommended that a survey of potential data
base sources be made to determine: a) the nature of the data available; b)
problems in accessing the data; c) proprietary issues to be dealt with; and d)
data format problems. Additional fault data is also available from the Boeing
flight test data base although the extent of this data is limited. The fault
scenario data base should be expanded using flight test data plus any fault
data which may become available as a result of the data base survey activities.
An expanded fault scenario data base would be used in the development and
testing of a stand alone MONITAUR.
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5.3 Context Impact Analysis
Context variables can have a major impact on action alternatives available to
the crew for any given fault/event combination. A framework for
conceptualizing the event/fault/context/action (E/F/C/A) relationship was
developed during the present contract. A systematic understanding of these
relationships across fault/event combinations when different context variables
are present or absent could be used to evaluate the viability of crew action
alternatives. This information could in turn be used to develop rules for the
knowledge base which fine tune the diagnostic process within the Flight Deck
Engine Advisor system. It is recommended that a systematic analysis be
carried out to assess the impact of context variable status on specific
fault/event combinations. Particular attention should be given to those
circumstances where context variable status might turn a viable crew action
alternative into a potentially unsafe action. The analysis should be conducted
within the context of a state-of-the-art glass cockpit airplane so as to provide
the greatest relevance to future flight deck systems.
5.4 Automation in Fault Management
If the Faultfinder concept is to be relevant to advanced technology airplanes,
the impact of automation on current and anticipated engine fault
management function allocation decisions must be fully understood. It is
recommended that an effort be undertaken to inventory the allocation of fault
management functions which has been implemented for state-of-the-art
commercial transport airplanes and critique the impact of this allocation
pattern on pilot situational awareness and crew fault management options.
8O
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APPENDIX A
FAULT SCENARIOS
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F1
Event: Hung Start : Ground
l
Fault: Fuel metering unit malfunction - providing too little fuel to fuel nozzles
Potential Fault Alternative_
Pneumatic System Faults
- Pneumatic pressure too low
- Airplane pneumatic duct failure
- Starter air valve failure
" " duct failure
- Starter failure (partial failure results in too
little air flow/pressure
Fuel System Faults
- Fuel metering unit
- Fuel shutoff valve
- Engine fuel pump
- fuel boost pump (high altitude air starts)
- Engine fuel line
- Mismanaged fuel system configuration
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Start Procedure Faults
- Attempt startwith excessive tail wind
- Airplane pneumatic system improperly configured
- Too cold: failure to use RICH; improper selection of
fuel; too cold even for RICH
- Outside of start envelope
- improper fuel
- Fuel pressurization when high rotor speed too low
Gas Generator Faults (Compressor/Turbine)
- Bleed valve failure
- Stator vanes off schedule (mechanical failure or
misrigging
- Compressor damage
- Turbine damage
- Low speed rotor locked (stuck)
Engine Control Faults
- Sensor fault
- Software error
- Hardware failure
- Actuator failure
- Engine wiring (e.g., intermittent broken connection between engine
controller and fuel metering unit)
Relevant Context Variables - Status
Phase of Flight - Ground start
Weather - Clear and dry; light crosswind; temp 50 deg F
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FARs -
Engine Fault History _ no persistent, related problems for engine or type
Airline Policy -
. Engine Commanded Status - Start
Pilot Error - None
Airplane System Status - Right Pack Inoperative
Workload - Moderate
Action Alternatives
Shut down and secure engine
Execute shutdowrdrestart procedures
Shutdown engine, correct fault, and execute restart procedures
Subsystems Affected
En_ne
Electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic power from affected engine would not be
available, but this information plays no role in fault diagnosis.
ProuaCation Sequence with Rank Order Time Base
Time t - Fuel metering valve commanded to start position by electronic
control.
Time tl - Valve moves to a partially open position and sticks OR fails to
move from minimum open position.
Time t2 - Fuel going into burner not sufficient to support normal spool up of
engine to idle.
Time t3 - FF begins to drop below flow rate' for normal start.
High rotor speed acceleration rate begins to lag behind normal
rate.
Low rotor speed still appears normal at this point.
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EGT increase rate normal.
Time t4 - High rotor speed still increasing but has only reached 75% of
normal for time into start sequence.
FF increasing but has only reached 70% of normal.
Low rotor speed le_;elled off at 53% of normal.
EGT still appears to be increasing at approximate normal rate.
Time t5 - High rotor speed still increasing but rate of increase falling off.
Should be at idle RPM at this point but only at 67% of idle RPM.
FF fluctuating (probably not visible on cockpit gauge) and still
increasing slowly; should be stable at this point.
Low rotor speed very slow increase, 41% below normal.
EGT rate of increase right on normal for time into start sequence.
Time t6 - High rotor speed, FF, low rotor speed all 40-70% below normal.
EGT continuing to increase instead of levelling off; 13% above
normal and rising.
Time t7 - High rotor speed, FF, and low rotor speed leveling off below
normal. High rotor speed peaks at 49% and begins sharp decline
following starter disengage. Low rotor speed begins to decline a
few seconds later.
EGT continues to rise at same rate and is approaching start red
line (hot start conditions developing).
Time t8 - Fuel cutoff switch closed.
Data Pilots Have Available
Source of Data:
EICAS Engine Instruments
Engine Start Panel
ExplanatiQn QfRelationships:
Pilots use high rotor speed to indicate appropriate time to turn fuel ON then go
by the "clock" (real time monitored or estimated) to determine if "light off' has
occurred normally. Once light off has occurred, they monitor high rotor speed
and EGT to determine if a start is progressing normally: Fuel Flow (FF), EGT,
and low rotor speed also have appropriate rates of increase during a normal
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start; however, the rate of change for each parameter will be different. If a
normal start is not achieved, high rotor speed will begin to decline if a 50%
speed has been achieved and the starter disengages. When starters disengage,
starter switches snap to the GRND or OFF position. This produces an audible
click which is a cue for starter disengage in addition to a visual check of the
switch position.
0uality of Data:
Fuel flow data is processed and smoothed before being presented on the EICAS
display. Thus the fine grain data on this parameter which can be used for
early detection of a hung start due to fuel metering problems is not available in
the cockpit in a easily detectable form.
Heuristics or Rules of Thumb Used:
The typical high rotor speed/EGT relationship looked for is high rotor speed X
10 = EGT. Since the critical factor is avoiding a hot start, more attention is
probably paid to EGT than anything else. In the type offault leading to a hung
start presented in this scenario, focusing attention on EGT can lead to delayed
detection of the hung start condition. EGT continues to increase at a close to
normal rate long afar definite symptoms of a hung start are apparent in other
parameters.
Time Constraints:
Light off normally occurs within 10 seconds after fuel ON. Stable parameter
readings at idle should be achieved at approximately time tS. Hot start
indications become apparent very rapidly once conditions are right. Pilots will
have only a few seconds at most to recognize them and shut off fuel to the
engine before an overtemp condition develops.
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Comments:
If the data used in this fault scenario is typical, then hung starts are difficult
for pilots to detect until either a) a long time has passed (well over a minute), or
b) the hot start phase begins arid EGT rapidly heads for the "start" red line.
Information Required to Make Diaa_osis
Key Parameters:
Fuel Flow
High Rotor Speed
EGT
Low Rotor Speed
Symptoms:
At time t3:
- Marked departure of fuel flow from normal rate of increase.
- Small deviation in rate of change in High Rotor Speed.
- Low Rotor Speed rate of increase normal.
EGT rate of increase normal.
At time t4:
- High Rotor Speed still increasing but with marked deviation from
normal in rate.
- Fuel flow increasing but far below normal rate.
- Low rotor speed essentially levelled off, should be increasing rapidly.
- EGT increasing at normal rate.
Fuel flow and high and low rotor speed continue to increase at decreasing
rates until starter cutout at t7. At that point, high rotor speed begins to decline
sharply followed by declining low rotor speed. EGT continues to increase at a
normal rate until tS. Beyond t5, EGT continues to increase at the same rate
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instead of leveling off as it should. This leads to the hot start phase of the hung
start.
Interpretation:
In general, detecting a hung start in progress requires the detection of
deviations from normal in the rates of change on the four parameters listed
above; i.e., detecting changes in the rates of change 1 . The symptoms for
detecting the onset of a hung start caused by a fault in the fuel metering
system present a particular challenge to pilots because the parameter showing
the earliest departure from normal is fuel flow (see time t3 above). The change
in the rate of change in high rotor speed has also begun to take place by t3 but
would be difficult to detect in the cockpit at this point. Adding to the detection
problem is the fact that low rotor speed and EGT are progressing normally at
this point. By t4, FF and High and Low Rotor Speeds clearly indicate a hung
start in progress but EGT is progressing normally, The problem, from a
pilot's perspective, is; a) determining that a hung start is in progress, while b)
seeing that high rotor speed is still increasing at a rate which is not perceptibly
different from normal but knowing that at that point it is in fact 15% low, and
c) all the while seeing EGT progress normally. The data available from
sensors is not available to the crew at the same grain on the EICAS as it shown
on sensor data printouts. And even if it were, the complexity of the monitoring
and deviation detection process required for _ll detection of a hung start is
clearly beyond the capability of the crew, Hence the start scenario heuristic
reported above which pilots use to monitor engine starts. This heuristic
inevitably leads to much later recognition of the event in progress and much
higher probability of an over temp condition occurring. This particular
scenario is a case in point. EGT continued to progress normally long after the
hung start condition was obvious in the pattern of the other three engine
parameters. Engine shut down was not initiated until much later when a hot
. start was in progress.
There are two objectives of diagnosis in an event such as hung start. The first
objective must be to provide an alert to the crew that the event is in progress;
1 MONITAUR does not now contain a parameter for processing changes in rates of change.
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i.e., a normal start is not in progress. This requires evaluation of information
about changes in rates of change on four parameters (high and low rotor
speeds, FF, EGT). By comparing this information with the output from an
engine model, it is possible to diagnose a developing hung start less than half
way into the start sequence.
The second objective is to diagnose to the fault or Fault/Action Class. This may
be taken to the subsystem (e.g., fuel pneumatic, procedural, etc.) or component
level (fuel metering) within the propulsion system. Here the purpose is to
provide part of the basis for determining relevant action alternatives. The
Hung Start-Ground data plot on fuel flow shows a marked deviation from
normal before mid point in the start sequence (t3). This may be sufficient to
narrow the location of the fault to the fuel subsystem. While it may not be
possible to differentiate among all potential fault alternatives within the fuel
subsystem, it may be possible to distinguish between subclasses. The
importance of such distinctions will depend on their impact on action
alternatives.
Information Required for Decision Aidin_
Nature of the Fault:
Selection of or recommendations on the appropriate action alternative requires
knowledge of the nature of the fault or fault/action class. The components of
that knowledge are: 1) a hung start is in progress; 2) the engine is not
receiving the appropriate fuel/air mixture; and 3) whether electrical,
mechanical, or procedural subsystems are involved. The actions required by
pilots in dealing with the fault generally will differ only if the fault is
procedural vs. electrical or mechanical.
The data for this fault scenario is based on a mechanical failure. It is a
malfunctioning valve in the fuel metering system. It is not a transitory
failure. The corrective action must be taken by Maintenance.
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Relevant Context Variable Set:
Phase of Flight
Weather
Engine Fault History
Engine Commanded Staths
Pilot Error
Airplane System Status
Workload
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables for:
Diagnosti_ Application - Because phase of flight is "ground start", all those
potential fault alternatives peculiar to air starts can be eliminated from
further consideration. The value of the weather variable would serve to
eliminate the possibility of gusts up the tail pipe and temperature too cold as
potential faults. Improper fuel, pneumatic system configuration, and
premature fuel ON during start sequence cannot be eliminated. These
procedural faults need crew and]or maintenance input to eliminate. For the
particular context variable set chosen, no history values will aid in diagnosing
the fault. The system status item is not relevant as a direct contributor but
would have influenced pneumatic system configuration. The workload
variable operates in conjunction with other variables to produce an effect. It
can operate with other context variables or with certain fault categories,
namely procedural faults. Beyond this point, diagnosis must rely on the
propagation sequence and pattern of symptoms.
Action Alternatives Application - The application here is very straightforward.
Given the context variable set plus the fact that diagnosis has been made to the
component level (fuel metering unit), there is only one appropriate action. The
° "Shutdown, correct fault, and execute restart procedures" is not appropriate
because the pilots can not carry out the corrective action.
Recommended Action Alternative - Shut down and secure engine.
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FLIGI-IT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F2
Event: Engine Flameout
i
Fault: Fuel Boost Pump failure - due to A/C power loss
Potential Fault Alternatives
Loss of both boost pumps in same tank
Engine fuel pump failure
Mismanaged fuel configuration
Fuel line fracture
R_levant (_ontext Variables - Status
Phase of Flight - Cruise: above fuel suction feed altitude
Weather -
FARs -
Engine Fault History -
Airline Policy -
Engine Commanded Status - Steady state
Airplane Systems Status - Crossfeed valves closed
Fuel Type -
' Workload - Light
A_ti0n Alternatives
Recycle generator and bus tie switches
Reconfigure fuel system
Reduce altitude to suction feed level
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Subsystems Affected
Fuel Delivery
Engine
AC electrical (a failure malfunction in this subsystem would produce the same
event. Some or all of the action alternatives might be the same as those
identified above.)
Proua_ation SeQuence with Rank Order Time Base
(The same propagation sequence within the engine would occur if AC power
were lost to the fuel boost pump.)
Time t - All subsystem operation and parameter values normal for
conditions of flight
Time tl - Fuel boost pump fails.
Time t2 - A 25# (approx.) step drop occurs in fuel pressure. This is not
enough to trip fuel pressure switch light or EICAS message
circuits. No change occurs in fuel flow, High or Low Rotor
Speeds.
Time t3 - Fuel pressure shows only slight further decline over approx
quarter of a minute. No change in other engine parameters.
Time t4 - Fuel pressure drops precipitously to near zero. Fuel flow drops to
near zero (this indication should be clearly visible in the cockpit).
High and low rotor speeds begin to drop off gradually. Fuel
pressure switch light and EICAS message circuits would be
tripped by this drop.
Time t5 - Fuel pressure has levelled off at approx 25#. Fuel flow is at zero.
High rotor speed is slipping into sub-idle.
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Dat_ Pilots H_ve Available
Sources of Data:
A/C Electrical Control Panel
Fuel Control Panel
Altimeter
EICAS Messages
EICAS Engine Instruments
Explanation of Relationships:
The amber PRESS light within the fuel boost pump switch illuminates if pump
output pressure drops below 5-7 lbs. for 10 seconds for any reason. Thus with
an A/C power loss, lights on both the A/C Control Panel and the Fuel Control
Panel would come on. EICAS messages would appear for both the A/C power
loss and the boost pump pressure loss. If the airplane is above the suction feed
altitude for the airplane/fuel type combination, an EICAS message on fuel
system pressure loss will be displayed when cavitation occurs and the engine
driven pump pressure drops below threshold. The difference between fuel
boost pump failure indications and those for engine driven fuel pump failure
would be that a sequence of indications would occur for the boost pump failure
but only the fuel system pressure message would occur for engine driven
pump failure. Action alternatives for the two failures would be quite different.
Fuel flow does not change until flame out occurs. As the engine spools down
following flame out, an EICAS message indicating the generator on the
affected engine is off. For subtle faults producing a flame out, this message is
often the first indication of an event. This may be the event to the crew;
however, it is not the event of interest.
The altimeter reading combined with fuel type information would provide
information on whether the airplane was above suction feed altitude.
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Oualit$ of Dat_:
Switch lights and EICAS messages are triggered by parameters breaking
thresholds. No analog data on fuel pressure changes is available in the
cockpit. Thus, there is no inforination indicating a flame out is imminent and
no indication that it has occurred until the fuel system pressure and A/C
power loss messages appear.
Heuristics or Rules of Thumb Used:
None identified.
Time Constraints:
At high altitude cruise without fuel boost pump pressure, pilots have
approximately 15-20 seconds to detect the failure and take appropriate action
before flame out occurs.
Comments:
At altitudes where suction feed is only partially effective and cavitation is
beginning, the indications of fuel boost pump failure (or failure to turn on boost
pumps during climbout) will include fluctuations in fuel flow, and eventually,
fluctuating rotor speeds. Because fuel flow data is heavily massaged before
being displayed on EICAS, this source of information will not be indicative of a
problem until well after pump failure.
If a single fuel boost pump fails, no change is required in configuring the fuel
system because each tank has at least two boost pumps in it. Also, the
airplane must be above the altitude at which fuel cavitation occurs for that
particular plane/fuel combination. To have a flame out due to a fuel boost
pump related problem, one must a) be above suction feed altitude, and b) have
partial or total A/C power loss (depending on the airplane model), or c) have
multiple pump failures in the same tank under special fuel system
configuration conditions. EICAS messages will indicate low fuel pressure due
to pump failures or AJC generator failures. However, generator failure
messages will also appear when engines spool down below a certain RPM
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following flame out even though there is no problem with the generator per se.
The yaw produced by loss of an engine would probably not be felt in the cockpit
if the autopilot were engaged. Loss of airspeed, throttle lever movement,
attitude change, and possible initiation of drift down would be other indications
the crew might have that an engine had been lost.
Information Required to Make Diagnosis
Key Parameters:
Fuel Boost Pump Output Pressure
OR
Engine Driven Fuel Pump Pressure
AND
Fuel System Configuration
Altitude
_vmptoms:
When at high altitude cruise:
Fuel boost pump output pressure drops to zero.
Fuel system pressure drops as a step function by approximately 25 lbs. and
levels off for approximately 15-20 seconds then drops by another step function to
about 25 lbs.
Flame out occurs in less than 5 seconds after the precipitous drop in fuel
system pressure.
When at transitional altitude:
i
Fuel boost pump pressure drops to zero.
Suction feed is only partially effective in supplying fuel to engine driven pump.
Fuel system pressure fluctuates below what it would be with boost pumps on.
96
Fuel flow begins to fluctuate below cruise level.
High rotor speed begins to fluctuate and gradually fall off.
Interpretation:
The 25 lb. step function drop in fuel system pressure is the event signalling
fuel boost pump failure. If the airplane is above the suction feed altitude limit,
pilots have 15-20 seconds to take action to prevent a flame out. If the airplane is
in the transition zone, fuel system pressure, fuel flow, and high rotor speed
will begin to fluctuate with ever increasing excursions and fuel flow and high
rotor speed will begin to decrease.
Information Required for Decision Aiding
Nature of the Fault:
Selection of or recommendation of the appropriate action alternative requires
knowledge of the nature of the fault or fault/action class. The components of
that knowledge are: 1) a flameout is imminent; 2) the engine is not receiving
adequate fuel; and 3) whether the fault is electrical, mechanical, or procedural
in nature. The actions required to deal with the fault are different for the three
types of fault. Each require the reconfiguration of systems but the specific
actions are quite different.
Relevant Context Variable Set:
See earlier listing of context variables where relevant variables have status
values provided.
t
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables for:
Diagnostic Application - Loss of fuel boost pressure below the suction feed
altitude limit will not result in a flame out. Loss of fuel€boost pressure with the
crossfeed valve open will not result in a flame out. The airplane/fuel type
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combination will determine the suction feed altitude limit. Knowledge of the
altitude of the airplane is a factor in determining the cause of low fuel
pressure.
Action Recommendation Application - Action options can be exercised in turn
until the problem is solved.
Consequences of Inappropriate Alternative Actions:
Failure to properly configure the fuel system could lead to loss of up to four
engines.
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F3
Event: Thrust Shortfall at TOGA
Fault: FOD - Ice Ingestion: ligl_t damage
Potential Fault Alternatives:
FOD - bird ingestion
l_elevant Context Variables - Status
Phase of Flight - Climb out
Weather - Icing conditions
FARs -
EngineFault History -
Airline Policy -
Engine Commanded Status - Climb power
Pilot Error - Engine anti-ice system not turned on before entering icing
conditions
Airplane System Status - Engine anti-ice system activated after moderate ice
build up on engine cowl and/or spinner
Workload - Moderate
Action Alternatives
Continue to operate damaged engine at current power setting
Continue to operate damaged engine at reduced power setting
Shut down and secure damaged engine with restart option later in flight
' Shut down and secure damaged engine for duration of the flight
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_ubsvstems Affected
Engine
Thrust Management System (Autothrottle)
Propagation Sequence with Rarlk Order Time Base
Time t- Ice strikes fan blades
Time tl - Vibration in low speed rotor increases approx..5 units as a step
function. Vibration in high speed rotor increases as a step
function by approximately the same magnitude. No change is
discernible in any other parameters.
Time tn - Ice-damaged engine does not produce commanded thrust level
D_ta Available to Pilots
Source of Data:
Lower EICAS display of vibration
Explanation of Relationships:
Foreign object damage (FOD), in this case caused by ice ingestion, produces an
abrupt change in the level of vibration in the engine while all other parameters
remain normal. This indicates some level of fan or compressor blade damage.
The damage in turn reduces by some amount, directly related to the extent of
the damage, the amount of thrust shortfall experienced for a given throttle
setting. At low to moderate levels of FOD, pilots may not notice the relatively
small step increase in vibration level. Therefore, they would have no reason to
test thrust indication for shortfall. If the step increase were noticed, an
indication of shortfall to be expected under TOGA conditions could be
ascertained by advancing the throttles to maximum power and comparing
expected with achieved thrust indications. It is possible at altitudes above
FL170 for the engine controller to derate thrust and thus preclude detection of
thrust shortfall.
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Oualitv of Data:
The vibration display on EICAS is graduated in arbitrary units. The source of
vibration may be the frequency band monitored for the high speed rotor, the
band monitored for the low spee_l rotor, or what is referred to as broad band
vibration which is vibration measured over a wider band of frequencies which
includes the bands measured for the low and high speed rotors. Engines vary
considerably in their inherent vibration characteristics. Therefore, a specific
vibration reading has little generalizable meaning unless it is in the caution
range. Most engines do not even have caution range designations. Thus, the
pilots are left to judge the criticality of vibration level without guidance.
Vibration may appear to be an obvious cue, but cross-engine comparisons of
readings on the vibration instrumentmay not be helpful. These instruments
report the highest level of vibration present in one of three frequency bands
being monitored. A scan of the vibration gauges will not necessarily allow the
pilots to compare broad band vibration levels across engines. Each of the two
or four engines could be displaying vibration level from a different source.
The effects of light ice damage on thrust shortfall may be so subtle that they
would not be detected by the crew - until they needed TOGA power. As with
any FOD fault, the projection of engine performance and integrity over time is
a very important piece of information pilots need in their decision making but
one that is very difficult to predict unless the exact nature and extent of
damage is known.
Heuristics or Rules of Thllmb Used:
None identified.
Time Constraints:
, (See comments under this heading in the moderate and heavy ice damage
fault scenarios.)
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InfQrmation Required to Make Diagnosis:
Key Parameters:
Vibration
Primary Thrust Indicator '
_vmptoms:
The relatively small (.5 unit) step function change in vibration level is the only
symptom across all engine parameters indicating the presence of ice damage
until max power is applied. The relevance of going to max power :to produce
the thrust shortfall indication is tempered by comments made earlier that,
depending on the altitude, the engine controller may thwart attempts to check
for thrust shortfall in the damaged engine.
Interpretation:
As can be seen, the symptoms for diagnosing light ice damage are extremely
subtle. Detection of the damage requires; a) that the step function increase in
vibration be detected, and b) that the difference in vibration level before and
after damage has occurred can be recognized as a reliable symptom. The
comClrmlng factor is the recognition of thrust shortfall. With light damage, the
task may not be easy or even possible: What makes detection important is the
potential for engine performance degradation to levels critical to flight safety
either within the time frame of the current flight or on subsequent flights, if
undetected. A worst case scenario would be loss of the engine near V1 on take
off on a subsequent flight.
Information Required for Decision Aiding
Nature of the Fault:
Ice ingestion has caused light damage to fan blades.
Further deterioration, if any, which might occur in available thrust within the
duration of the current flight.
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Relevant Context Variable Set:
The relevant context variable set is composed of those variables listed earlier
which have status information included.
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables for:
Diaa-nostic ApplieatiQn - If different types of FOD result in different projections
of engine performance and or integrity, then context variables may be useful in
relevant differentiation among FOD faults. Phase of flight, weather, and
airplane system status will aid in differentiating ice damage from other FOD
faults if appropriate.
Action Re¢ommendati0n Application - Pilots may have the widest range of
action alternatives in this situation depending on the need for TOGA power
from the affected engine and the projected effect of maintaining thrust
setting(s) at the desired or required levels.
Consequences of Inappropriate Alternative Actions:
Acceleration and deceleration of the affected engine could lead to additional
damage if ice is dislodged from the spinner.
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F4
Event: Thrust Shortfall at cruise power and above
Fault: FOD - Ice Ingestion: moclerate damage
Potential Fault Alternative_:
FOD - Large bird ingestion
FOD - Multiple bird ingestion
Fan blade tip loss
Relevant Context Variables - Status:
Phase of Flight - Climb
Weather -Icing conditions
FOD Potential - Moderate
FARs -
Engine Fault History -
Airline Policy -
Engine Commanded Status - Climb power
Pilot Error - Engine anti-ice system not turned on before entering icing
conditions
Airplane System Status - Engine anti-ice activated after moderate ice build up
on engine cowl
Workload - light to moderate
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Aqtiqn Alt_rn_tiv_
Continue to operate damaged engine at current power setting
Continue to operate damaged engine at reduced power setting
Shut down and secure damaged' engine with restart option later in flight
Shut down and secure engine for duration of the flight
Accelerate and decelerate engines. Check instruments for vibration levels,
sluggish acceleration, thrust shortfall.
Subsystems Affected
Engine
Thrust Management System
ProDa_ation Seauence with Time Base
Time t- Precise timing on occurrence of moderate ice damage unknown
Time tl - Climb power commanded. Small thrust shortfall occurs at climb
power. Low rotor speed on target. High rotor speed shows 5%
shortfall. EGT and fuel flow slightly below expected values for
thrust setting. Increase in vibration on low speed rotor precedes
normal onset and exceeds expected value by 25%. Spike in high
speed rotor vibration as climb power is commanded then drop to
expected level.
Time t2- Cruise power commanded. Thrust shortfall increased slightly
from climb power shortfall. High rotor speed at expected level.
EGT and fuel flow remain slightly lower than expected. Vibration
in low speed rotor remains 25% above expected. Vibration in high
speed rotor averaging 200% higher than expected level.
Acceleration to commanded thrust level is slightly slower than
expected.
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Data Available to Pilots
Source of Data:
EICAS display: vibration and related thrust parameters
Explanation of Relationships:
No time marker is available to indicate the onset of ice ingestion which causes
moderate damage. Therefore, differences in vibration level must be evaluated
when power levels are changed rather than detecting a step function in
vibration level as an indicator of damage having occurred as was the case with
light ice damage. Interestingly enough, vibration levels and thrust shortfall
appear greater when cruise power is commanded than when climb power is
set and thrust shortfall, as indicated by the primary thrust parameter, is also
greater at the cruise setting (albeit by a small amount). The differences
between high rotor speeds and high speed rotor vibration at the two power
settings will make it difficult to use these information sources in generating
rules for diagnosing deviation patterns. Vibration, and particularly high
speed rotor vibration again seems to be the only clear indication of damage.
The problems pilots have in trying to interpret the vibration parameter have
already been discussed in the scenarios on light and heavy ice damage. The
other indications such as EGT and fuel flow shortfall as well as the high rotor
speed shortfall at climb power are subtle and would not likely be noticed in the
cockpit. These differences will likely fall within the noise band of MONITAUR
deviation detection and will not provide symptoms for diagnosis.
Ouality of Data:
Factors which relate to the quality of the data as presented to pilots have been
discussed above. These are: small differences in parameter levels across
engines; inconsistent differences in parameter levels at different power
settings; and the problem of interpreting changes in vibration level without :
clear guidelines.
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Heuristi¢_ or Rules of Thumb Used:
Time Constraints:
This issue of time constraints is the same as with light and heavy damage
i
conditions. A great deal depends on phase of flight. The current data set was
obtained in climb and cruise. Thus, time constraints in dealing with the
problem are not serious.
Information Required to Make Diagnosis
Key Parameters:
Thrust parameter
High rotor speed
Vibration : High and Low speed rotors
Fuel Flow and EGT may be secondary
•Symptoms:
Slightshortfallinthrustparameteratclimbpower
Slightshortfallinhighrotorspeedatclimbpower
Moderateelevationofexpectedlevelofvibrationinlow speedrotoratclimb•
power
Marked increaseinvibrationlevelon highspeedrotorat climbpower
Interpretation:
In the final analysis, the only reliable symptoms indicating fan and/or
compressor damage are the step function increases in vibration level
regardless of the source of the vibration reading. Vibration measurement for
low and high speed rotors and the broad band measure are described in the
fault scenario on light ice damage.
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Information Required for Decision Aiding
Nature of the Fault:
The pattern of symptoms found 'with moderate ice damage differs from those
found with light and heavy damage. The consistent theme across all levels of
damage is the increase in vibration level. In the long run, when vibration
levels and patterns in modern jet engines are adequately understood, this
parameter should be very useful in diagnosing the existence of FOD and
predicting the time course and levels of deterioration in engine performance
and integrity which results. In the meantime, step function increases in
vibration levels remain the only reliable indication of compressor damage. If
the damage is severe, other engine parameters will begin to deteriorate.
Relevant Context Variable Set:
The relevant context variable set is comprised of those variables listed earlier
which have a status indicated.
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables for:
Diagnostic Application - It is not clear at this point whether distinguishing
between objects ingested is useful in terms of implications for crew actions.
The utility of such a distinction probably lies in determining whether the time
course of deterioration in engine performance and/or integrity is changed as a
function of the object ingested. To the extent that it is, then it becomes
important to make the diagnostic distinction in order to provide the crew with
the information they need to properly determine their course of action.
A_ti0n Recommendation Application - Action alternatives very greatly in this
situation depending on the need for power from the affected engine and the
projected effect of maintaining throttle setting(s) at desired or required levels.
If projected effects could be determined with ehough accuracy and reliability,
this information would be very valuable to the pilots in deciding among
possible courses of action.
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Conseauences of Inappropriate Alternative Actions:
Acceleration and deceleration of engine could lead to additional damage if ice
is dislodged from spinner.
i
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F5
Event: Thrust Shortfall at cruise power and above
Fault: FOD - Ice Ingestion: heavy damage
Potential Fault Alternatives:
FOD - Large bird(s) ingestion
Fan blade tip(s) loss
Relevant Context Variables - Status:
Phase of Flight - Cruise
Weather - Icing conditions
FOD Potential - high
FARs -
Engine Fault History -
Airline Policy -
Engine Commanded Status - Climb power
Pilot Error - Engine anti-ice system not turned on until major build up of ice
occurs on cowling and/or spinner
Airplane System Status - Engine anti-ice OFF
Workload =light to moderate
A_tion Alternatives
Continue to operate damaged engine at current power setting
Continue to operate damaged engine at reduced power setting
Shut down and secure damaged engine with restart option later in flight
Shut down and secure engine for duration of the flight
II0
Accelerate and decelerate engines. Check instruments for vibration levels,
sluggish acceleration, thrust shortfall
Subsystems Affected
Engine
Propagation Sequence with Time Bo_e
Time t - Timing on occurrence of heavy ice damage unknown
Time tl- Cruise thrust commanded. Acceleration to commanded thrust
level is slower than expected. Thrust shortfall occurs at climb
power. Achieved thrust is approximately 80% of commanded.
Low rotor speed acceleration normal; high rotor speed slower
than expected. Fuel flow and EGT lower than expected.
Broadband vibration level increases 3 units above expected level.
Time t2 - At commanded thrust level, low and high speed rotor vibration at
expected levels. Broadband vibration remains 3 units higher than
expected on ice damaged engine.
Data Available to Pilot_
Source of D_ta:
EICAS display: vibration, thrust parameters, cross engine comparisons
Explanation of Relationships:
No time marker on the occurrence of heavy ice ingestion was available in the
data base. Therefore, the step increase in vibration apparent with initial light
ice damage was not available. It is not known if such a step increase would
have occurred. The vibration symptom only becomes apparent when the
throttle on the ice damaged engine is advanced in concert with throttle
advance on the normal engine. Changes in vibration levels in the ice damaged
engine on low and high speed rotors are evident with light and moderate ice
damage but do not show up with heavy damage.- Instead, the vibration
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symptom evident for heavy damage is a marked increase in broad band
vibration. The reliability of this difference in symptoms cannot be ascertained
without comparable duplication of the incident and/or verification by expert
opinion. The extent of damage is clearly evident in the amount of thrust
shortfall which occurs at higher power settings. The shortfall with light ice
damage is only evident under TOGA power settings. Moderate ice damage
results in a slight shortfall at climb power. Whereas with heavy ice damage,
the shortfall is very evident even at cruise power (i.e., approximately 80% of
normal). Thus, heavy damage may be more easily detected than light or
moderate damage. Although, the problem noted in regard to light damage
(i.e., where in some cases above FL170 the engine controller may derate thrust)
could mitigate the value of throttle movement as a source of information about
the extent or possibly even the presence of thrust shortfall.
Changes in vibration level, while obvious when viewing the data printouts,
may not be obvious or even detectable on vibration indicators in the cockpit.
Quality of Data:
Pilots must rely on memory and cross engine comparisons to detect the
problem and assess severity. Neither source provides high quality
comparative data. Pilots must detect the step increase in vibration as such as
a major initial symptom of FOD. If the damage is light, this is a very difficult
task. With heavy damage, the problem is more obvious and the action
alternatives more limited. Thrust shortfall with light to moderate damage will
only be detected at relatively high power settings (the lighter the damage, the
higher the power setting must be to detect the shortfall). Cross engine
comparisons _ provide evidence of damage but normal engine differences
in vibration and thrust can mask the effects of light to moderate damage. The
same can be said of differences across engines in thrust and rotor speed
acceleration.
Heuristics or Rules of Thumb Used:
None identified.
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Time Constraints:
Whether time constraints exist will depend on phase of flight. The data which
support this scenario were gathered during climb out and cruise. Thus time
would be available to assess the' problem and determine action options without
serious constraint. If the icing and damage had occurred during descent, the
time available for diagnosis and planning could be constrained. However, the
need for maximum power under these conditions would only occur if a go
around were required.
Information Required to Make Diagnosis
Key Parameters:
Vibration
Thrust
Low and high rotor speed
Svmutoms:
Noticeable (e.g., 20%) thrust shortfall at cruise power settings; i.e., engine is
producing only 80% of the thrust normally expected at the throttle setting used.
Thrust acceleration below expected when throttle advanced.
Both low and high speed rotor vibration normal
Broad band vibration 3 units higher than expected on ice damaged engine
Interpretation:
As can be seen, the symptoms for diagnosing even heavy ice-induced damage
are quite subtle. Vibration may be an obvious cue, but cross-engine
. comparisons of readings on the vibration instrument may not be helpful.
These instruments report the highest level of vibration present in one of three
locations on the total bandwidth of frequencies monitored; i.e., frequency
windows for low or high speed rotor and broad band. A scan of the vibration
gauges will not necessarily allow the pilots to compare broad band vibration
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levels across engines. Each of the two or four engines could be displaying
vibration level from a different source.
The ice damage fault is an example of the type of fault which may require pilot
action to provide the type of infdrmation really needed to complete the diagnosis
of a fault or even to make the crew aware of the presence of an event; i.e., that
there is a definite thrust shortfall in the affected engine. This presents some
interesting issues. Is it possible that a different fault may lead to the same
event, but the pilot action required to fully diagnose the ice damage fault would
have serious negative consequences such as loss of the engine for the duration
of the flight? Addressing these issues fully is beyond the scope of the present
analysis.
The three fault scenarios on ice damage are the closest thing we have to trend
data. The change in symptoms which represent damage at different levels is
interesting to note. We do not know at this point whether the pattern of
changes in relevant symptoms will generalize across FOD faults. Nor do we
know what further deterioration in engine performance and integrity will
occur as a function of continuing to operate the engine at a particular power
setting 2 . Although propulsion engineers may be able to provide general,
qualitative projections, they are not willing to do so formally. In the real
world, predictions on performance trends and integrity may range in
importance from useful to critical depending on phase of flight.
Information Required for Decision Aiding
Nature of the Fault:
Clearly, the extent of the ice damage is an important factor in decisions which
involve the availability of thrust. The detection of thrust shortfall and the
prediction of additional deterioration in engine performance and integrity is
important regardless of the specific nature of the FOD fault. Because of the
2 The engine on which data were gathered was operated for several hours after the damage
occurred. However, it would not have been had the pilot realized the extent of the damage
incurred.
114
procedure used in inducing ice damage, we can not be sure that the symptom
pattern would be the same with say the ingestion of small, medium, and large
birds. That is, the sudden onset of FOD at different levels of damage may
produce a different pattern of symptoms.
There should be additional contextual information available which would
allow the diagnostic system to differentiate among at least some of the fault
alternatives which could lead to the event in question - thrust shortfall.
Relevant Context Variable Set:
The relevant context variable set is comprised of those variables listed earlier
which have a status indicated.
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables for:
Diaa_ostic Application - If different types of FOD result in different projections
of engine performance and or integrity, then context variables may useful in
relevant differentiation among FOD faults. Several factors will aid in
differentiating between ice damage and at least one other fault alternative,
namely large bird ingestion. Phase of flight is cruise (although not high
cruise) thus greatly reducing the odds of bird ingestion 3 . Icing conditions are
present and the anti-ice system(s) are not on. Workload is such that requiring
pilot action to generate additional symptoms is not out of the question.
Action Recommendation Application - Action alternatives very greatly in this
situation depending on the need for power from the affected engine and the
projected effect of maintaining throttle setting(s) at desired or required levels.
If projected effects could be determined with enough accuracy and reliability,
this information would be very valuable to the pilots in deciding among
possible courses of action. The British Midlands crash is an example of
depending on an engine with FOD (fan blade tip loss and ingestion) as, in that
3 Although there has been at least one report of an eagle striking the windscreen on a
commercial transport jet at cruise altitude. _
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case, the only source of power. The pilots need information as to what they can
count on in the way of thrust under all relevant circumstances.
Consequences of Inappropriate Alternative Actions:
I
Acceleration and deceleration of engine could lead to additional damage if ice
is dislodged from spinner. Depending on the engine and the nature of the
FOD, throttle movement of any kind may be very inappropriate.
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F6
Event: All Engine Flameout
Fault: FOD - Volcanic ash ingestion producing fuel nozzle clogging
Potential Fault Alternatives:
Mismanaged fuel system configuration
Relevant Context Variables - Status:
Phase of Flight - Descent
Weather - Broken clouds below. Thin layer of"white clouds" at FL260
FOD Potential - High, volcanic eruption in area
FARs -
Engine Fault History -
Airline Policy - with regard to use of Autostart
Engine Commanded Status - Before encountering ash, Low rotor speed at idle.
Subsequent commands were 60%, 80%, Max Power, 80%, Max
Power. Engines were at commanded Max Power when power loss
began.
Pilot Error - Throttle advances not advised under circumstances 4 .
Airplane Systems Status - All operating normally
Workload- Moderate, before flameout
Training/Procedures - Event/fault combination not anticipated
Action Alternative_:
Airspeed to middle of start envelope
4 It is unfair to label the crew action as pilot error for the particular incident on which data were
available because the crew performed as trained and on the basis of information available in
Ops Manuals at the time. Adjustments to training and Ops Manuals have since been changed
to reflect appropriate action alternatives.
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Attempt immediate restart 0nanual or auto)
Execute shutdown/restart procedures
Reduce throttles to idle while in vicinity of ash cloud(preventative measure)
Engines 1 & 4 (or left) to idle, use 2 & 3 (or right) as needed
Subsy_t_m_ Affected:
Engines
Engine driven electrical and hydraulic subsystems drop off line as engine
spool down below idle, but this information plays no role in fault identification.
Propagation Sequence with Time Base:
Time t - Proximity to volcanic ash cloud realized
Time tl - Low rotor speed increases on all engines - commanded
Time t2 - Descent halted
Time t3 - Max power applied and airplane begins to climb
Time t4 - Climb stops at 28000 feet
Time t5 - High and low rotor speed on all engines drops sharply
Time t6 - Sharp rise in all EGT's accompanied by decreasing high rotor
speed
Time t7- All engines go sub-idle
Time t8 - All engine flameout has occurred, all generators drop off line
Data Availabl_ to Pilot_
Source of Data:
Visual sighting of ash cloud
EICAS display of engine parameters
ATC relayed reports of location of ash cloud
118
Explanation of Relationships:
In this case, the information needed to select the appropriate action alternative
is available only through hindsight and much testing. The actions taken in
this case were exactly the opposite of those which should have been taken.
Increasing power while ingesting volcanic ash accelerates the sooting or
coking action on the turbine fuel nozzles which in turn starves the engine of
fuel. Diagnosis of the fault requires information beyond the airplane; i.e.,
visual sighting of the ash cloud and/or communications from ATC or other
aircraft. There is no pattern of engine parameter behavior which would alert
the crew to impending FOD from volcanic ash. Neither is there a pattern in
engine parameter behavior on which the monitoring and diagnostic modules
could reason. Selecting the correct action alternative depends on recognition of
external conditions and training as to the appropriate action(s) in the presence
of these conditions.
Ouality of Data:
No information is available to the pilots from flight deck instrumentation
which would allow them to predict the potential for an all engine flameout.
The "data" available for dealing with this situation would be training and
experience.
Heuristics or Rules of Thumb Used:
To avoid trouble - climb
Time Constraints:
Time constraints for an all engine flameout are a function of altitude.
However, any time all power is lost on all engines, time will be perceived as
being very short indeed.
Information Required to Make Diagnosis
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Key Parameters:
Fuel Flow
Low and High Rotor Speeds
EGT
Symptoms:
The initial symptom would be the deviation of actual fuel flow from fuel flow
needed to achieve commanded thrust level. Propagation symptoms include a
rapid loss of high and low rotor speed accompanied by rapidly increasing EGT.
These latter symptoms are evident in the cockpit, but by the time they appear
the flameout cannot be avoided.
Interpretation:
The time frame from onset of the coking action to flameout is not known but is
dependent upon power settings. The DFDR data would indicate that the time
frame may be very short indeed if inappropriate thrust commands are
implemented.
An accurate measure of actual fuel flow compared to the engine controller
"model" of fuel flow for commanded thrust level would show the inconsistency
in fuel flow needed for commanded thrust vs. that being achieved. This a case
where all the information MONITAUR would require to identify the deviation
is available in the engine controller but is not available to the crew.
Information Required for Decision Aiding
Nature of the Fault:
This fault represents and interesting challenge because it involves the need for
information external to the airplane for accurate diagnosis. It also represents
an example of where context variable status is critical to accurate diagnosis.
The requirement for accurate diagnosis to the' specific fault level is still under
study. The question is How does appropriate crew action differ for flameout
from fuel nozzle clogging due to volcanic ash ingestion v_s. say flameout due to
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water ingestion? In this pa_icular comparison, the answer is interesting.
When in the presenceof or about to encounter volcanic ash, retard the
throttles. When ingesting large amounts of water, advance throttles to full
power. If use of the autostart system is the answer for all faults in this and
related categories, then the mal)ping of Event/Fault combinations via context
variables to appropriate action alternative will be a simple, straightforward
relationship. If not, the Flight Deck Engine Advisor system may require pilot
input to complete the diagnostic process. The example given just above
suggests the relationship will not be simple or straightforward.
Relevant Context Variable Set:
Phase of Flight - Descent
Weather - Broken clouds below. Thin layer of "white clouds" at FL260
FOD Potential - High, volcanic eruption in area
Airline Policy - especially with regard to use of Autostart
Pilot Error - Throttle advances not advised under circumstances.
Airplane Systems Status - All operating normally
Workload - Moderate, before flameout
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables for:
Diagnostic Application - Accurate diagnosis requires timely information on
deviations in fuel flow from normal for commanded thrust level and external
information about the potential for FOD from volcanic ash in the vicinity.
Action Recommendation Application - The relationship of this particular
Event/Fault combination to action alternatives has not been determined as yet.
The determination will hinge on the effectiveness of potential crew actions on
correcting or mitigating the effects of volcanic ash ingestion.
Consequences of Inappropriate Alternative Actions: Advancing the throttles
to max power when ingesting volcanic ash produces the conditions within the
engine which result in a flameout; i.e., temperatures are increased and the
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coking or clogging of fuel nozzles results in reduced thrust and eventually
flameout - the higher the power setting called for, the greater the coking
action. Thus, advancing throttles in the presence of volcanic ash is an action
alternative to be avoided. Without appropriate instructions on the appropriate
action coupled with pilots' conditioned response to climb out of trouble, the
stage is set in these circumstances for an all engine flameout.
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F7
Event: Hung Start - Air
Fault: Fuel nozzle coking (due to ingestion of volcanic ash)
Potential Fault Alt_rnative_: J
Pneumatic System Faults
- Pneumatic pressure too low
- Airplane pneumatic duct failure
- Starter air valve failure
" " duct failure
- Starter failure (partial failure results in too little torque
Fuel System Faults
- Fuel metering unit
- Fuel shutoff valve
- Engine fuel pump
- fuel boost pump (high altitude air starts)
- Engine fuel line
- Mismanaged fuel system configuration
- Crossfeed valve failure
123
Start Procedure Faults
- Airplane pneumatic system improperly configured
- Too cold: failure to use RICH; improper selection of
fuel; too cold even for R.ICH
- Outside of start envelopes
- Fuel pressurization when high rotor speed too low
Gas Generator Faults (Compressor/Turbine)
- Bleed valve failure
- Stator vanes off schedule (mechanical failure)
- Compressor damage
- Turbine damage
- Low speed rotor locked (stuck)
Engine Control Faults
- Sensor fault
- Software error
- Hardware failure
- Actuator failure
- Engine wiring (e.g., intermittent broken connection between engine
controller and fuel metering unit)
Relevant Context Variables - Status:
Phase of Flight - Descent
Weather - High thin clouds
FOD Potential - High, volcanic eruption in area
FARs -
Engine Fault History -
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Airline Policy - Autostart system use not mandatory
Engine Commanded Status - Start
Pilot Error - Autostart system OFF; Failure to distinguish between air and
ground start characteristics
Airplane Systems Status - All engines flamed out; battery standby power only
available. Windmilling start required.
Workload - High; Stress level extremely high
Action Alternatives:
Activate Autostart system (if available)
Execute shutdown and manual restart procedures - single engine
Execute shutdown and manual restart procedures - multi-engine
Subsystems Affected:
Engine(s)
All airplane systems are affected. Normally however, the PFD, ND, and upper
EICAS will remain on being powered as they are by the standby bus.
Propagation Sequence With Time Base:
Start sequence data plots are truncated due to generators dropping off line and
resulting loss of power in flight deck recorders. Several hung starts occurred
in start attempts on three of four engines during the course of the event. The
sequence reported below will be an amalgamation of data across engines and
start attempts.
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t(unknown) - Engine start initiated
Time tl - Low rotor speed at approximately 24%; high rotor speed nearly
level at 45%; EGT at 510 deg. C.; fuel flow nearly flat at 800#
Time t2 - low rotor speed flat at 24%; high rotor speed nearly flat at 46%;
EGT rising rapidly at 540; fuel flow nearly flat at 850#
Time t3 - low rotor speed flat; high rotor speed nearly flat at 48%; EGT
rising rapidly to 610; fuel flow nearly flat at 900#
Time t4 - Start attempt aborted
Data Available to Pilots
Pilots use high rotor speed to indicate appropriate time to turn fuel ON then go
by the "clock" (real time monitored or estimated) to determine if "light off' has
occurred normally. Light off can take 2 to 3 minutes in an air start. Once light
off has occurred, they monitor high rotor speed and EGT to determine if a start
is progressing normally. Fuel Flow (FF), EGT, and low rotor speed also have
appropriate rates of increase during a normal air start. However, this rate of
change for each parameter can differ somewhat from that achieved during a
ground start. On the ground, if a normal start is not achieved, high rotor
speed will begin to decline when a speed of 50% has been achieved and the
starter disengages. In an air start with all engines flamed out, no bleed air is
available to power the starter so a windmilling start must be accomplished.
Rate of increase in engine parameters during such a start may be significantly
slower than for a normal ground start.
Source of Data:
1
Upper EICAS is the only source of data on engine parameter behavior. The
primary thrust parameter would be shown in'full scale. All other engine
parameters are shown in digital form only.
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Explanation of Relationships:
Ouality of Data:
' The quality of the data available to the pilots on key parameters with only the
upper EICAS available would not be degraded from normal. However, the
o "grain" of the data available normally is not fine enough to pick up trends in
parameters until major departures from normal have occurred.
Heuristics or Rule@ of Thumb Used:
The typical high rotor speed/EGT relationship looked for is high rotor speed X
10 = EGT during the initial stages of spool-up following light off. On the
ground, a normal start should be accomplished in 45 to 60 seconds. In an air
start however, the time frame for a normal start may be doubled, tripled, or
more.
The appropriateness of this rule of thumb varies across engines and is not
applicable to an air start.
Time Constraints:
Light off normally occurs within 10 seconds after fuel ON for a ground start
but may take 2-3 minutes in an air start. Stable parameter readings at idle
should be achieved within one to two minutes for a ground start but can take
much longer in an air start. Changes in the rates of change for high rotor
speed and EGT are slower for an air start. Thus, hung and hot start
indications will not be as obvious as they typically are in a ground start.
Likewise, a normal start may be in progress, but if ground start criteria are
used, a hung start may be assumed.
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Information Required to Make Diagnosis
Key Parameters:
High rotor speed
EGT
/
Fuel Flow
Symptoms:
High rotor speed remains relatively flat for up to 60 seconds or more after light
off. EGT rises relatively quickly and fails to stabilize with evidence of normal
spool up. Under the event/fault condition defined for this scenario (i.e., all-
engine flameout) EGT exceedences would probably be ignored in the interest of
getting an engine started.
Interpretation:
In this incident, the engine parameters during start exhibited typical
hung/hot start characteristics. With fuel input low and relatively constant,
combustion processes were not sufficient to drive the turbines, and
consequently the high speed rotor, to normal idle speed. With high rotor speed
low relative to normal, insufficient air was flowing through the engine relative
to the amount of fuel available resulting in rapidly rising EGT.
As many as twelve restart attempts were performed on some of the engines.
For those restart attempts where data are available, the parameter values for
high rotor speed and fuel flow improve slightly with each restart attempt until
a normal start is achieved.
InformatiQn Required for Decision Aiding
Nature of the Fault:
The fault is in the fuel system; specifically clogged fuel nozzles. Typically,
with faults other than procedural faults there is little pilots can do to correct
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the fault. However, speculation is that the numerous attempts to restart the
engines may have aided in dislodging the coking on the fuel nozzles.
Relevant Context Variable Set:
Phase of Flight - Descent
Weather - High thin clouds in area make it difficult to identify volcanic ash
clouds
FOD Potential - High, volcanic eruption in area
Airline Policy - Autostart system use not mandatory
Engine Commanded Status - Start
Pilot Error - Autostart system OFF; possible failure to distinguish between air
and ground start characteristics; advancing throttle to climb
power accelerated coking process
Airplane Systems Status - All engines flamed out; only systems powered by
standby bus available
Workload - High; Stress level extremely high
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variables for:
o
Dia_ostic Application - Phase of flight is a major factor in diagnosing the
fault. The rates at which parameters change during an air start are different
than the rates during a ground start. Rates which would indicate a hung start
on the ground may be normal for an air start. All starter related items among
the fault alternatives are eliminated if the starter is not available or not used.
Action Recommendation Application - When in the vicinity of volcanic ash, the
. recommended action is to reduce power setting; e.g., pilots could reduce power
on half their engines and use the other half for maintaining altitude or
_ climbing. In the event of an all engine flameout, engine start attempts should
be monitored closely to avoid shutting down engines which have a normal start
in progress vs. those that have hung or hot starts in progress.
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Consequences of Inappropriate Alternative Actions:
Advancing throttles to climb power in the presence of volcanic ash accelerates
the coking or clogging process on the fuel nozzles. Appropriate action is to
retard the throttles. This is coritrary to the natural tendency of pilots to climb
out of trouble.
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FLIGHT DECK ENGINE ADVISOR
FAULT SCENARIO - F8
Event: Stall/Surge
Fault: Stability margin problem
Potential Fault Alternatives:
FOD
Procedural error
Stator vane failure
Bleed valve control failure
Relevant Context Variables:
Phase of Flight - Take Off
Weather - Clear and 15
FOD Potential -
FARs -
Engine Fault History - prototype engine
Airline Policy -
Pilot Error - Throttle on affected engine should be retarded
Airplane System Status -
Workload - High
.Action Alternatives:
Retard throttle on affected engine
Retard throttle on affected engine, command full power on other engine(s)
,_ Subs_v.stems Affected:
Engine
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Propagation Sequence with Rank Order Time Base:
Time tl - Beta stator vane angle showing high frequency, low amplitude
fluctuations
Time t2 - Fluctuations in Beta SVA increase in amplitude and become quite
regular in pattern
Time t3 - High response low pressure compressor (LPC) static pressure
sensor 5 shows definite high frequency, moderate amplitude
fluctuation
Time t4 - High response LPC static pressure shows very definite high
frequency, high amplitude fluctuations
Time t5 - High response total LPC pressure beginning to show definite
fluctuating pattern
Time t6 - Standard LPC static pressure sensor 6 showing definite low
frequency fluctuating pattern
Time t7- Fuel flow shows uncommanded 7 drop
Time t8 - Low and high rotor speeds decelerate sharply
Time t9 - EGT goes off scale several times at less than 1 sec intervals
5 Sensorunique to flight test.
6 Sensor is on some operational engines. Getting information on some of these parameters
would be possible if the engine controller uses the information in it control laws.
7 Throttle not re_arded but engine controller cut fuel flow."
132
Data Pilots Have Available
Source of Data:
EICAS display of engine parameters
The auditory indicators (pops and/or loud bangs) of surging
Explanation of Relationships:
The indications in the cockpit are after the fact. Engine controller commanded
reduction in fuel flow occurs about 1.5 sec before the throttle is chopped. Low
and high rotor speeds drop sharply when fuel flow is cut back. The EGT
excursions may be displayed on the EICAS if the EICAS system does not damp
high frequency oscillations. However, the excursions may not be seen by the
pilots.
Quality of Data:
No information on the flight deck of impending stall and surging. This type of
information (were it available) should be processed through an engine advisor
system and presented to the crew as an alert.
Heuristics or Rules of Thumb Used:
None identified
Time Constraints:
The data from special flight test instrumentation provides a clear indication
that stalls and surges are developing up to 15 seconds or more before the surge
occurs, with operational sensors a 5 second warning may be possible. This is
still adequate for crew action. However, the appropriate action depends on
where the airplane is in terms of phase of flight. With the case in point, the
actual stall occurred very early in initial clim_), Here the appropriate action
I:
would be to retard the throttle on the affected engine and command full throttle
on the remaining engine(s). With 15 seconds warning and assuming at that
point the airplane was below V1, the appropriate'action would be to abort the
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takeoff; if above V1 and at a safe altitude, retard throttle as required and
command full throttle on other engine(s). During climb, TOC, TOD, or
descent, time constraints are less critical and appropriate action is to retard
the throttle.
Inf0rm_i0n Required tQ M_ke Diae_nosis
Key Parameters:
Beta Stator Vane Angle - an operational sensor but data not available to the
flight deck
High Response Discharge Static Pressure at Low Pressure Compressor -
special flight test instrumentation
High Response LPC Discharge Total Pressure - special flight test
instrumentation
Standard LPC Discharge Static Pressure - operational instrumentation but
data not available to the flight deck
All engine parameter data available on EICAS display the results of the stall
and surging; i.e., fuel flow, high and low rotor speeds, EGT.
Neither the stator vane angle sensor nor the discharge pressure sensors are
represented in the engine model or MONITAUR.
_ymptoms:
At time tl - The earliest indication of a problem developing appears to be the
high frequency oscillation of Beta stator vane angle. However,
stator vane angle is on steady state schedule; i.e., the level of the
parameter is alright. Since it is' on schedule, stator vane failure
can be eliminated as a potential fault alternative. The very high
frequency oscillation does not appear in the stator vane angle data
d
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after recovery although oscillation is still present and amplitude
is reduced.
At time t2 - Beta SVA oscillations increase in frequency and amplitude.
At time t3 - High response LPC static pressure has definite high frequency,
moderate amplitude oscillations.
At time t4 - High response LPC static pressure has very definite high
frequency, high amplitude oscillations.
At time t5 - High response total LPC pressure beginning to show definite
oscillations
At time t6 - Standard LPC pressure showing definite oscillating pattern
Interpretation:
The problem here from the standpoint of Engine Advisor development is that
we have sensor data that clearly indicates the onset of stalls and surges; BUT,
the best indications come from delicate flight test sensors, AND we have no
engine model parameter data for these sensors. Advanced engine controllers
now have some capability to sense, interpret, and act to prevent stalls and
surging. If this capability is reliable and appropriately activated throughout
the flight regime, then the Engine Advisor role is one of advising after the fact
in terms of action alternatives and implications for safety of flight and flight
replanning. If this automation has not been implemented, then the Engine
Advisor role is that of alerting the crew in a timely manner of the action
required. In the first case, improvements focus on increased sensitivity of
sensors and development of the crew interface capability of Engine Advisor. In
the second case, improvements focus on adequate sensor development for _he
operational environment and development of the appropriate parameter
models for an engine model.
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Information Required for Decision Aiding
Nature of the Fault:
In discussing the nature of the 'fault, we have an interesting problem here.
The fault, a stability margin problem is not supposed to occur on operational
engines. Yet operational engines do stall and surge. The question is how well
does the data we have to develop and test Engine Advisor represent stall and
surging data from an operational setting? Further, there are a number of
faults or flight conditions which can produce stall and surging. The problem
is basically that of detecting the onset of symptoms which lead to stall and
surging in a timely manner so that either the crew or engine controller can
take action to prevent the full development of the condition. As outlined above,
in the first case, the Engine Advisor system must provide an alerting function;
in the second, an advisory function.
Relevant Context Variable Set:
Phase of Flight - Take Off (TOC, TOD ; i,e., significant changes in angle of
attack) s
Weather - (especially heavy rain)
FOD Potential - (birds, blown tire parts, etc.)
Engine Fault History - propensity for stall and surging
Pilot Error - overreaction in reducing throttle setting(s)
Workload - high
Relationship Between Fault and Context Variable_ for:
Diagn0_tic ApDlication - Stall and surging symptoms may be different in either
degree or sequence or both as a function of phase of flight. The nature of FOD
source may also affect symptom presence and/or degree. _
Action Alternatives Application - Phase of flight is a key factor in determining .
the appropriateness of action alternatives. Engine fault history may be such
8 Status information in parentheses indicates status level of relevant alternative faults.
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that crews have a good deal of actual experience in dealing with stall and
surging conditions.
Consequences of Inappropriate Alternative Acti0n@:
Stall and surge conditions developing at or near V1 can lead to inappropriate
actions on the part of the pilots. A good deal of accident and incident data
attest to this. Pilots should take no action at all under these conditions until
reaching a safe altitude. The need for either timely alerting or appropriate
advisory information is critical to the selection of the correct action alternative.
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